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This is the first English translation of the Prolegomena iuris 
 naturalis by Gottfried Achenwall (1719–1772). In this book, 
Achenwall presents the philosophical foundation for his com-
prehensive  theory of natural law. The book is of interest not 
only because it provides the basis for a careful, systematic, and 
well-respected eighteenth-century theory of natural law in the 
Leibniz-Wolffian tradition, but also because it sheds important 
light on the work of Immanuel Kant. Achenwall’s work influ-
enced Kant’s legal and political philosophy as well as his ethics, 
and it is indispensable for understanding Kant’s Feyerabend 
Lectures on Natural Law and his Metaphysics of Morals. The 
present volume complements the translation of Achenwall’s 
handbook, Natural Law.
Pauline Kleingeld is Professor of Philosophy at the Univer-
sity of Groningen, the Netherlands.
Corinna Vermeulen, PhD, is a professional translator and 
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I n this book, Gottfried Achenwall presents the philo-sophical foundation and basic concepts for a theory of 
natural law, in particular for his own comprehensive 
account, presented in his handbook Natural Law (Ius natu-
rae, eight editions, 1750-1781). Both his Prolegomena to Nat-
ural Law and Natural Law itself are of interest not only 
because they offer a careful, systematic, and well-respected 
eighteenth-century theory of natural law in the Leibniz -
Wolffian tradition, but also because they shed valuable light 
on the work of Immanuel Kant.
Achenwall’s handbook was used widely for more than a 
generation to introduce students to natural law theory, thus 
shaping the background understanding of public and aca-
demic discussions of the subject, especially in the Ger-
man-speaking world. The first English translation of the 
handbook, also by Corinna Vermeulen, was published by 
Bloomsbury Academic in 2020.1 The present volume offers 
1 Gottfried Achenwall, Natural Law: A Translation of the Textbook for 
Kant’s Lectures on Legal and Political Philosophy, edited by Pauline 
Kleingeld, translated by Corinna Vermeulen, with an Introduction by 
Paul Guyer (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020). This volume 
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the first English translation of Achenwall’s Prolegomena and 
complements the translation of his handbook.
Both works are highly relevant to Kant scholarship. Kant 
assigned Natural Law for his course on the topic, which he 
taught at least twelve times between 1767 and 1788.2 Only 
one surviving transcript of these lectures is known, namely 
the Feyerabend Lectures on Natural Law. This transcript is 
based on lectures Kant held during the summer semester of 
1784, at the very time he was writing his seminal work in 
moral theory, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 
(1785). These lectures include Kant’s own legal and political 
philosophy of the mid-1780s, as well as his exposition and 
criticism of Achenwall’s theory. In his lectures, Kant refers 
not only to Natural Law but also to specific passages and 
arguments in the Prolegomena. These works had a formative 
influence both on Kant’s legal and political philosophy and 
on his ethics; that is, they informed Kant’s “moral” philoso-
phy in the broad sense as comprising both “right” (Recht)3 
and “ethics.”
provides a translation of the 5th edition of the handbook, published in 
1763, which is the edition Kant used. 
2 See Frederick Rauscher’s introduction to his translation of Kant’s 
Feyer abend Lectures, in Immanuel Kant, Lectures and Drafts on Polit-
ical Philosophy, edited by Frederick Rauscher and Kenneth Westphal, 
p. 75-76 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
3 Like ius, the term Recht is notoriously difficult to translate into 
 English. Within Kant scholarship Recht is now commonly translated 
as “right.” The resulting awkwardness serves to remind readers of the 
fact that the translation is imperfect. In the case of the natural law 
tradition and the relevant scholarship, however, ius is more often 
ixEDITOR’S INTRODUCTION
Gottfried Achenwall
Achenwall was born in 1719 in Elbing (Elblag), which was 
then part of Poland. He studied law, philosophy, and history 
at the universities of Jena, Halle, and Leipzig and subse-
quently taught first as a private tutor in Dresden and then as 
an unsalaried university instructor (Privatdozent) in Mar-
burg. In 1748, he became professor extraordinarius of philos-
ophy at the University of Göttingen, a young and modern 
university that had been founded in 1737 by the Elector of 
Hanover (formally of Brunswick-Lüneburg), King George 
ii of Great Britain. In Göttingen, Achenwall rose through 
the academic ranks with positions in law and philosophy, 
obtaining doctorates in both. He became a full professor of 
philosophy in 1753 and a full professor of law in 1761. With 
financial support from King George iii, he undertook sev-
eral trips to other European countries, where he studied 
their legal, political, economic, and cultural practices and 
institutions. He died in Göttingen in 1772. 
Achenwall was well known at the time not only for his 
work in natural law but especially for approaching the polit-
ical, economic, and social characteristics of states as a matter 
of systematic empirical academic research. He offered com-
parative descriptions of the forms of government and 
administration, the use of natural resources, the economic 
systems, and other features of several European states. As a 
 rendered as “law,” which is why this term was chosen for the title of 
this book. See also “Remarks on the Translation,” p. xxvi.
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result, he became known for promoting the methodical 
 “science of states,” or “statistics,”4 by which he meant com-
parative political science.
Publication History and Present Translation 
In the first two editions of Achenwall’s compendium, then 
still published under the title Elementa iuris naturae (Ele-
ments of Natural Law, 1750, 1753)5 and co-authored with 
Johann Stephan Pütter (1725-1807), the “prolegomena” 
formed a tiny section at the beginning of the book, amount-
ing to eight pages in total. It included definitions of core 
notions such as ius (law, right) and ius naturale (natural law, 
natural right), as well as brief references to relevant authors 
such as Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Wolff. These eight pages of 
prolegomena (prefatory remarks) were followed by several 
lengthier chapters with praecognita (what should be known 
beforehand, viz., in order to understand the theory of natural 
law). In these chapters, Pütter and Achenwall carefully laid 
out their conception of action, free will, law, coercion, impu-
tation, and related matters before moving to their exposition 
of the theory of natural law in the rest of the book.
4 Note that this term is not used here in its current meaning as referring 
to a branch of mathematics. Achenwall is often credited with being 
the father of statistics in the latter sense, but this is a mistake. What he 
means by the term is rather a branch of political science.
5 There is a German translation of the first edition of the Elementa iuris 
naturae of 1750: Johann Stephan Pütter and Gottfried Achenwall, 
Anfangsgründe des Naturrechts (Elementa iuris naturae), translated 
and edited by Jan Schröder (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1995). 
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Following the publication of the second edition of the 
Elements of Natural Law, Pütter was no longer involved, 
and Achenwall assumed sole responsibility for the com-
pendium. Starting with the third edition (1755), he changed 
its title to Natural Law and expanded the book with sub-
sequent editions. When the fourth edition was published 
in 1758, the book had become so large that it was impossi-
ble to cover its contents in a single semester. Achenwall 
therefore decided to publish the philosophical and concep-
tual preliminaries—the prolegomena and praecognita—
separately under the title Prolegomena to Natural Law, to 
be treated in a course of its own. The first edition of the 
Prolegomena was published in 1758, and the fifth and final 
edition came out in 1781. Each new edition of the Prole-
gomena was published simultaneously with a new edition 
of Natural Law.
The present translation is based on the second edition 
(1763) of the Prolegomena and complements the English 
translation of the fifth edition (also from 1763) of Natural 
Law. In his handbook, Achenwall often refers the reader to 
passages in the Prolegomena for further explanation or jus-
tification of specific points. In the 1763 edition of the hand-
book, these references are to the 1763 edition of the Prole-
gomena. Thus, the publication of the present volume makes 
it possible to look up the references to the Prolegomena in 
Achenwall’s Natural Law. Moreover, since the Prolegomena 
includes the philosophical groundwork and basic concepts 
of the handbook, it is indispensable for gaining a complete 
understanding of Achenwall’s theory of natural law.
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The earlier choice to translate the 1763 edition of Natural 
Law was in turn motivated by its importance for Kant schol-
arship. Kant’s personal copy of Achenwall’s handbook was a 
copy of the fifth edition (of 1763), and over the years Kant 
filled its two volumes with copious handwritten notes, often 
for the purposes of his lectures. His annotated copy of the 
first volume was lost. The notes from the second volume 
were transcribed and published in the Akademie-Ausgabe of 
Kant’s writings (aa), together with the Latin text of the 
second volume of the 1763 edition of Achenwall’s Natural 
Law (aa 19: 333-613). A selection of these notes was trans-
lated into English by Frederick Rauscher and published in 
the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.6 
The translation of the 1763 edition of Natural Law makes it 
possible for Anglophone readers to connect Kant’s notes to 
the relevant parts of Achenwall’s work. The publication of 
the present translation of the Prolegomena now also makes 
it possible to examine Achenwall’s theory of natural law in 
its entirety.
The Contents of the Prolegomena
In the Prolegomena, Achenwall lays the foundation for the 
theory of natural law that he develops in Natural Law. Start-
ing from very abstract general concepts and principles 
drawn from the “higher disciplines of philosophy” (Preface, 
p. 5), he gradually moves towards a specific conception of 
6 See note 2 above.
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natural law and its constituent elements. Both the form and 
the substance of his argument reveal the strong influence of 
Christian Wolff.
Achenwall begins with an exposition of very basic con-
cepts such as “action,” “will,” “freedom,” “obligation,” “law,” 
and “imputation.” He claims that obligation is the moral 
necessity that springs from the representation of a true good 
that would result from a certain action. He then argues that 
self-perfection is known to be a true good and that humans 
consequently have an obligation to perfect themselves as 
much as they can. This involves, he argues, that they have an 
obligation to live in a way that suits their nature as rational 
animals, that is, to live a life consistent with sound reason 
(§§ 11-24). The obligation to perfect oneself is “the general 
and first principle of all obligations and laws to which a man7 
may be subject” (§ 23).
A proposition that states an obligation is called a law, the 
obligation to act in accordance with God’s will is called a 
moral obligation, and a moral obligation that can be known 
by reason alone is a natural obligation (§§ 13, 43, 49). On 
this basis, Achenwall defines a natural law as follows:
7 In order to avoid anachronisms, homo has been translated as “man.” 
Achenwall’s description of the relation between husband and wife, 
father and mother, master and mistress within the household is rather 
egalitarian (Natural Law ii, §§ 41–84, but note the final sentence of 
§ 43). Nowhere does he problematize the subjection of women out-
side the domestic sphere, however. See also “Remarks on the Transla-
tion,” p. xxv.
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a natural law is a moral or divine law that can be 
known from philosophical principles, and it is a prop-
osition in accordance with which we are obligated to 
direct our actions, because of God’s will, in as far as we 
are able to know it by reason alone. (§ 50)
He claims that since there is no obligation without a pro-
posed good or bad consequence, moral obligation requires 
prospective divine rewards and punishments (§ 55).
As the quoted passage makes clear, by saying that natural 
laws require that we act in accordance with God’s will, 
Achenwall does not mean to imply that their ground is 
inscrutable to human beings. To the contrary, natural laws 
are precisely those (moral or divine) laws that can be known 
by reason alone. In good rationalist fashion, Achenwall 
explains that to this extent God has made it possible for 
humans to know his will by reason alone—in contrast to 
knowledge of the “positive divine laws,” for which one needs 
special divine revelation (§§ 50, 64). The systematic knowl-
edge of all natural laws taken together is called “natural law” 
in the broad sense, and this is the subject matter of moral 
philosophy. The positive divine laws are the subject matter 
of theology (§ 51).
Since natural obligations are “common to all men,” 
Achenwall subsequently argues, there is an obligation to 
“join forces with the rest of mankind” in order to fulfill 
them. This involves an obligation to form a society (§ 82). Of 
the “greatest interest” is that type of society known as the 
state, but the state is composed of families, which in turn are 
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composed of several types of “domestic society”—the mat-
rimonial, parental, and master society (§ 95). For each of 
these types of society, as well as for the relations among 
states, there is a specific subset of natural laws (discussed in 
detail in Natural Law).
After having thus determined the concept and scope of 
natural law, Achenwall then moves on to a discussion of 
obligations, rights, and coercion. He defines a perfect obliga-
tion as an obligation where, “if you violate it, I have the 
moral ability to coerce you for that reason” (§ 98), and this 
moral ability on my part is called a perfect right (or simply a 
right, § 100). He argues that everyone has a natural obliga-
tion of self-preservation as part of the obligation to perfect 
oneself, and hence that everyone has “the right to his own 
preservation,” that is, the authority to apply force against 
those who violate it. Other natural obligations—“duties 
toward God, toward oneself, and the other duties toward 
other men”—are not perfect but imperfect (§ 106). Imperfect 
obligations are those that are not linked to the authority to 
coerce.
Those obligations that are connected with the threat of 
human coercion are called external obligations and are to be 
distinguished from the merely internal obligations that 
cannot be humanly coerced. Only the former can be judged 
in a human court; the others require divine judgment (§ 112, 
§ 140). 
Achenwall then discusses what it means for someone to 
have something as “one’s own” and defines notions such as 
“wrong,” “loss,” and “proprietorship.” For some object to be 
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“yours” is for you to “have an (external) right to use [it] and 
to exclude others from its use” (§ 119); others have a corre-
sponding perfect obligation to abstain from its use, an obli-
gation which is external, that is, subject to human coercion. 
Moreover, not only the object but also the right itself can be 
said to be “yours” or your “proper right” (§ 119).
In the final chapter, Achenwall lists the principles of nat-
ural law that he derives from the preceding account. They 
are the following perfect laws: “wrong no one, cultivate jus-
tice, give each his own, do not take away anyone’s proper 
right, abstain from that which is another’s, do not cause 
anyone a loss, restore the loss that you have caused” (§ 131). 
For each of these laws, there are corresponding principles of 
strict natural rights (§ 132). Having thus laid the foundation 
for his handbook’s detailed account of specific natural laws 
and rights in particular domains, Achenwall ends with a 
brief discussion of conflicts of duty (§§ 142-149).
Achenwall and Kant
Kant regularly taught Achenwall’s handbook and also 
referred to the Prolegomena to Natural Law (e.g. aa 27: 1330-
31, 1332). He valued Achenwall as a “cautious, precise, and 
modest” author (aa 8: 301). In his own work, Kant employs 
many of the concepts and distinctions found and explained 
in detail in Achenwall’s work. This is clearest in Kant’s Feyer-
abend Lectures on Natural Law, of course, since these lec-
tures were designed around Achenwall’s handbook. But 
Kant also makes use of Achenwall’s work elsewhere, espe-
cially in his later legal and political theory, such as “On the 
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Common Saying: This May Be Correct in Theory, But It Is 
of No Use in Practice” (1793) and the “Doctrine of Right” of 
the Metaphysics of Morals (1797). As Sharon Byrd and Joa-
chim Hruschka have shown, even as late as the “Doctrine of 
Right,” Kant was still using the 1763 edition of Achenwall’s 
work on natural law.8
The relevance of Achenwall’s work is not limited to Kant’s 
legal and political theory, however. It also sheds light on 
Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties in 
the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, which, as he 
explains, differs from the ordinary understanding of these 
terms (aa 4: 421n.), and on Kant’s account of the relation 
between “right” and “ethics,” to mention just a few promi-
nent examples.
This should not be misunderstood as implying that Kant 
agrees with Achenwall on matters of philosophical substance. 
He strongly disagrees with Achenwall’s justification of natu-
ral law, for example, and he generally presents his own theory 
not as a form of natural law (Naturrecht) but simply as a 
theory of “law/right” (Recht). In the Feyerabend Lectures, 
Kant rejects Achenwall’s claim that moral obligation requires 
rewards and punishments (aa 27: 1329). Furthermore, in 
contrast to Achenwall, he includes certain duties to oneself 
under the heading of perfect duties. These are just a few 
examples; for an illuminating in-depth discussion of the 
8 B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka, Kant’s Doctrine of Right: 
A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 15-19.
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 relation between Achenwall and Kant, I refer the reader to 
Paul Guyer’s introduction in Achenwall’s Natural Law.
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Remarks on the Translation
Corinna Vermeulen
T he use of italics and capitalization of entire words mostly follows the original text, in which Achenwall 
uses italics to highlight the important points for his students 
and capitalizes whole words to make definitions stand out. 
I have added some italics of my own following modern 
usage, to signal words in foreign languages, and have tacitly 
corrected obvious typographical errors in this respect. The 
corresponding page numbers in the original edition1 are 
given in the margin.
Achenwall’s bibliographical references—there are few in 
the Prolegomena, especially in comparison to the Ius natu-
rae—have been checked and corrected or supplemented 
where necessary. Achenwall often provides Latinized ver-
sions of the authors’ names, which do not always corre-
spond to the names under which they published their work. 
In this translation the authors are given the names by which 
they are known nowadays, so as to make it easier for current 
1 Gottfried Achenwall, Prolegomena iuris naturalis in usum auditorum, 
denuo curatius exarata (“written anew with greater care”) (Göttingen: 
Victorinus Bossiegelius, 1763).
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readers to recognize to whom Achenwall is referring and to 
track down their work.
I had already translated Achenwall’s Ius naturae (Natural 
Law)2 when I came to his Prolegomena iuris naturalis, the 
preliminaries to the main work. Translating the Prolego-
mena was, in a way, far more straightforward than translat-
ing Ius naturae, because in the Prolegomena Achenwall 
simply lays out the basics, systematically explaining the 
notions upon which the two parts of Ius naturae are built. I 
had already made most of the terminological choices; some, 
of course, had to be revised in the process, and a lot of cross- 
checking between the Prolegomena and the Ius naturae was 
involved. Evidently the “Remarks on the Translation” in 
both books overlap in part, but they also complement one 
another and may mutually provide an interesting perspec-
tive.
The nature of the work—a textbook for students—and 
Achenwall’s noticeable predilection for airtight systems and 
consistent structuring present the translator with specific 
difficulties. The many definitions and frequent references to 
preceding paragraphs involve a lot of cross-checking to 
guarantee a consistent translation. On the other hand, the 
different idioms of Latin and English sometimes make one-
to-one translations impossible. Language is not mathemat-
2 Gottfried Achenwall, Natural Law: A Translation of the Textbook for 
Kant’s Lectures on Legal and Political Philosophy, ed. Pauline Kleingeld, 
transl. Corinna Vermeulen, introd. Paul Guyer (London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2020).
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ics, not even in a highly systematic text such as this one, and 
not even Achenwall is always consistent in his use of certain 
terms.
To give some examples of varying translations of a single 
Latin word: depending on the context, I have used both 
“obligate” and “oblige” for obligare, have translated existima-
tio with “esteem” or “reputation,”3 and have used “enforcing” 
as well as “exacting” to render extorsio.4 In the latter case 
and a few others, I took the liberty of adding the synonyms 
to the definition or explanation, as Achenwall himself often 
does. Vice versa Achenwall sometimes adds synonyms for 
Latin technical terms that he apparently thought would be 
of use to his students, while English has no useful equiva-
lents: in such cases I have left out the untranslatable syno-
nyms.
I have aimed for a readable translation that respects Eng-
lish usage as much as possible while being as faithful as pos-
sible to the original and avoiding anachronisms. The latter 
means that I have kept the old-fashioned “man” for homo 
instead of introducing human beings: to Achenwall and his 
contemporaries, men were the self-evident norm and 
women were naturally invisible in discourse on almost any 
subject.
3 In the Prolegomena (§ 72), only the sense of “reputation” occurs, while 
in the elaboration on ius bonae existimationis in Ius naturae it turns 
out that “esteem” often is the more suitable translation.
4 Prol. § 98, 137, 106ff.
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Respecting English usage means that I have rendered ius 
with either “law” or “right,” instead of always using “right” 
as historians of philosophy working on Kant have tended to 
do.5 After long deliberation I have chosen “rightful” and 
“wrongful” for iustus and iniustus, at least in the case of acts 
and the like; for persons I have used “just” and “unjust.”6
Respecting English usage also means avoiding the 
numerous false friends that the English translator finds in 
Latin. To name a few: merus rarely means “mere,” affirmati-
vus usually should not be translated with “affirmative,” ratio 
is not always (a) reason, habitus often does not mean “habit,” 
and a facultas is not always a faculty. Likewise, I have ren-
dered factum commissivum with “positive act” (introduced 
as a synonym in Prol. § 7) in all occurrences after § 7, 
because “act of commission” no longer is the neutral term 
that it was to Achenwall and for most current readers will 
have the connotation of committing a crime.
In Prol. § 7 our author distinguishes between actio (which 
I have translated with “action” whenever possible) and 
factum (which I have rendered mostly with “act” and occa-
sionally with “deed”); then there is actus (“act,” usually), 
which is not defined as a technical term and which Achen-
wall uses at will as Latin usage dictates. A further difference 
(which Achenwall doesn’t have to make explicit and which 
is lost in translation) is that a factum—as opposed to actio 
5 See Prol. § 44 and note.
6 See Prol. § 116 and note.
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and actus—is always thought of as something in the past, 
because the noun derives directly from the perfect participle 
of facere (“to do/make”).
In § 4 and § 6, Achenwall defines the two related human 
faculties of voluntas and arbitrium respectively (although he 
appears to use them as synonyms in Natural Law I § 77). 
While in Natural Law I had sometimes chosen “wish” for 
voluntas because “will” didn’t fit the context, in the Prole-
gomena I have used “will” throughout. I have rendered arbi-
trium with “choice” everywhere, because in the Prolegomena 
it is used strictly as a technical term for that faculty and 
combined with liberum (“free”) in all cases occurring after 
§ 6.7
The complex structure of technical terms that Achenwall 
uses to discuss aspects of property presented its own prob-
lems. In Natural Law I decided to render dominium with 
“dominion” everywhere, following the Oxford translation of 
Pufendorf ’s De jure naturae et gentium8 (“ownership” didn’t 
fit all the occurrences), dominus with “owner,” and proprietas 
with “proprietorship.” I have maintained the latter here and 
was surprised to see that dominion, an important concept in 
Natural Law, does not occur in the Prolegomena at all.
7 In Ius naturae on the other hand arbitrium is used rather loosely, 
without liberum, and in translating I could use “discretion” as well.
8 Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium libri octo, 2 vols. (pho-
tographic reprod. of the edition of 1688; transl. C. H. and W. A. Old-
father), The Classics of International Law, vol. 17 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1934).
PROLEGOMENA TO NATURAL LAWxxviii
The cluster that includes suum/meum etc., ius suum/
meum etc., (ius) proprium, alienum is pivotal to both texts; 
it is hard to translate, let alone to translate elegantly, and 
impossible to translate consistently. I have chosen solutions 
using “proper,” “property,” “another’s,” “another’s own,” “his” 
etc., “his own” etc., and “to own.”9 Just as suum poses a prob-
lem in Latin sentence construction because it must refer to 
the syntactical subject (which probably gave rise to the use 
of proprium as a synonym), in English one cannot always 
use “own” without creating confusion. 
Achenwall’s Latin is typical of eighteenth-century aca-
demia: one could call it practical or ugly. His sentences, 
although sometimes long and treacherous (which is often 
due to the punctuation system that he used, quite different 
from ours), are never nearly as complicated as Cicero’s or as 
elegant as Erasmus’s. I have tacitly corrected the few real 
mistakes that he makes, and have occasionally retained a 
clumsy phrasing with pleasure.
Textual criticism of the source text is an integral part of 
translation. Circumstances dictated using the edition of 
1763, which goes with the Ius naturae edition that I used. I 
made emendations as I went along; they are listed on p. 113. 
I have left out my corrections in the use of italic versus 
roman type.
My work on the Prolegomena naturally profited from the 
support I received while translating the Ius naturae. As was 
9 See, for instance, Prol. § 119–125, 130, 135.
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the case then, Pauline Kleingeld initiated the project and 
read through the translation with hawk-eyed care, once 
more providing useful comments from a philosophical 
point of view as well as attentive support throughout the 
process. Mike Gregory gave some helpful suggestions as 
well, while Christoph Pieper and Jan Waszink generously 
shared their thoughts on some problems with the Latin. It 
goes without saying that I alone am accountable for the 
remaining errors—I know they are there, because perfect 
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I t is my intention to lay out in these preliminaries the philosophical arguments that pave the way to a more 
correct establishment as well as a fuller understanding of 
the specific natural rights and obligations. Knowledge of 
these arguments should thus precede dealing with the single 
parts of natural law, in order to understand the higher and 
primary reasons of any eternal laws whatsoever, from which 
the proximate reason of any single law—each to be noted in 
its proper place—arises, and from which their connection 
and system may be grasped at the same time. And so what I 
plan to teach in this little work mostly comes under two 
headings: I have to explain the more general principles that 
are sought from the higher disciplines of philosophy and on 
which universal law is built as upon a foundation, and I also 
have to examine the principles that pertain to forming a 
genuine concept of natural law and that concern this field 
generally and as a whole.
These Prolegomena, which so far were part of my book Ele-
ments of Natural Law, I have now decided to separate from 
that body and publish them in a single booklet, because 
once I had made an improved and largely rewritten version, 
they had become too sizeable to be thoroughly discussed 
together with the entire system of natural law itself, in the 
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same series of lectures that must be finished within a semes-
ter. For that reason the Prolegomena also remain intended 
for separate lectures.
Göttingen, July 20, ad 1758. 
PROLEGOMENA TO NATURAL LAW 1
CHAPTER I  
THE FREE ACTIONS 
OF MAN
§ 1.
M an consists of an organic body and a soul provided with various faculties, united by very close commu-
nication, by means of which man’s astonishing aptitude is 
brought about to bring forth innumerable actions: both 
external actions, which can be perceived with the exter-
nal senses, and internal actions, which cannot be per-
ceived in that way. The former are performed by movement 
of the body’s organs, the latter by the soul’s power only.
§ 2.
As concerns our soul in particular, it possesses both a cog-
nitive faculty, by which it knows, and an appetitive faculty, 
by which it strives for that which we represent to ourselves 
as good, and hence avoids what we represent as bad.
2
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§ 3.
Both these faculties are either higher, in as far as we 
can know objects distinctly and on the basis of distinct 
representations can strive for or avoid some things; or 
lower, in as far as we can know objects only obscurely or 
confusedly, and on the basis of such indistinct ideas can 
strive for or avoid some things. We have both the cognitive 
and the appetitive faculty that is lower in common with irra-
tional animals, but the faculty that is called higher is proper 
to man.
§ 4.
The higher cognitive faculty is in one word called the 
intellect, to which also reason belongs, i.e., the ability 
to understand the connection between things. The higher 
appetitive faculty is called the will, which includes 
not-willing.
§ 5.
Therefore the will depends on the intellect in the sense that 
the former builds upon the latter, § 3. From this it follows 
that 1) if man were without the faculty of understanding, he 
would lack the faculty of willing as well, and 2) in any man in 
whom the use of the intellect is impeded, the use of the will is 
impeded as well. Moreover, it is clear that every act of a man’s 
appetitive faculty, and consequently also his every act of will 
(volition and nolition) stems from striving for some good or 
avoiding something bad, in one word: from a man’s propen-
3
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sity to his own perfection, i.e., from the instinct to perfect 
himself, § 2.
§ 6.
Man furthermore enjoys the faculty of determining him-
self (by an intrinsic principle) both to acting and to 
not-acting, by spontaneity (choice).1 This faculty of man 
as a being gifted with intellect, i.e. in as far as he is spirit, 
is called liberty of the mind (internal liberty, free 
choice) and in law is often simply called choice or discre-
tion; hence man himself is called a person, that is: a sub-
stance that is free, or gifted with free choice. Like all the 
other faculties of our soul, the liberty of the human mind 
should be viewed as a faculty of a finite spirit.
§ 7.
Action that depends on man’s free choice, i.e. whose reason 
lies in his liberty of mind, is called man’s free action 
(human action par excellence). If a free action is conceived 
of in a positive way, it is called an act of  commission (a 
1 Achenwall here introduces the concept of arbitrium, a faculty related 
to voluntas. In order to keep the distinction between these two clear, I 
have consistently translated them with “choice” and “will” respec-
tively, even though the word “choice” sometimes sounds a little 
strange. See also “Remarks on the Translation,” p. xxvii.
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positive act);2 if it is conceived of negatively, it is an act of 
omission (a negative act). In as far as free action is regarded 
as particular, that is: under particular determinations, or in 
concreto, it is an act (a free deed). Hence an act is either a 
positive act (an act strictly speaking) or an act of omission (a 
non-act).
§ 8.
Thus without intellect there is no free choice, § 6, and 
hence if the use of the intellect is impeded, so is the use 
and action of free choice, § 5; it follows that only the action 
of a man who has the full use of his intellect is free. Moreo-
ver, for me to actually do something, it is required that I 
am physically able to do it, i.e. that doing it is in my power, 
i.e. that I am provided with sufficient powers to do it. From 
this it is clear that that which I am physically unable to do 
as such does not depend on my free choice and therefore 
cannot be regarded as a free action of mine either. Indeed 
only that which I am physically able to decide to do or to 
omit equally is freely done by me, § 5, i.e. that which is in 
2 In the subsequent occurrences of “act of commission” I have replaced 
it with its synonym “positive act,” because “act of commission” no 
longer is the neutral term that it was to Achenwall and is always asso-
ciated with committing a crime. By the same token I have avoided the 
verb “commit” where Achenwall uses committere in combination 
with a rightful act. Incidentally, Achenwall uses actio here, as factum 
has not yet been introduced; but translating it with “action” would be 
undesirable in this combination. See also “Remarks on the Transla-
tion,” p. xxvi-xxvii.
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my power to do, together with its opposite. For this reason, 
anything that is physically impossible (either simply or in a 
certain respect) and every physically necessary action 
whose opposite is not in the agent’s power (simply or in a 
certain respect) cannot be counted among the free actions if 
it is considered by itself.
* In free actions, especially positive acts and external 
actions (which can be perceived externally, § 1), we can 
distinguish the act by which we determine whether we 
should act or not from the act by which what we have 
determined is performed by the actual use of our fac-
ulties, i.e. actualized; and, in external actions in par-
ticular, from the motion of the body’s organs by means 
of which we achieve what we had determined. Hence 
by a logical abstraction free action is divided into free 
as regards determination and free as regards execution. 
As we have said, for an action to be free it is required 
that it be in the agent’s power, together with its oppo-
site; as a consequence for an action to be free both as 
regards determination and as regards execution, it is 
required that it be in the agent’s power to determine 
that he should act and equally that he should not act, 
and likewise both to execute and not to execute what 
he has determined.
§ 9.
All the actions of our will can be numbered among the free 
actions in as far as there is no volition or nolition of ours 
6
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that is found to be independent of our free choice in such a 
way that it cannot be directed by it at all, § 7. Consequently 
the human soul is free in willing and not willing. But we 
moreover experience that many actions of our soul’s other 
faculties, many movements of our body and sometimes even 
our very passions are controlled by our free choice, albeit 
indirectly, and therefore we can to that extent rightfully 
assign them to our free actions.
* An act of will3 and a free action thus differ in idea, 
and indeed there are many free actions that are not 
volitions at the same time; nonetheless, because every 
act of our will is in fact inseparably linked to free 
action and the liberty of the mind is evident mainly 
and directly in our volitions and nolitions, it has come 
to pass that many regard them as synonyms and that 
that which should properly be deduced from an action 
under the aspect that it is free, is simply asserted with 
regard to an act of will. Among jurists in any case, in 
whose fields free action and liberty of mind are of the 
greatest importance, practically no mention is ever 
made of these terms, but there is all the more talk of 
the will and consent as a kind of acts of will. And there 
is no harm in talking like jurists, as long as our views 
are those of the philosophers.
3 As in § 7, Achenwall uses actio here; see the note there.
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** In as far as the actions of man’s other faculties 
depend on the liberty of his soul, it is considered to 
have overlordship over them and over itself, consisting 
in the faculty of the human soul to freely produce 
actions now of this, then of that faculty, then again 
their opposites; and on similar grounds our soul is 
considered to be in control of our body.
*** On the liberty of the mind, it is worthwhile to con-
sult Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, Principes du droit 
naturel, 2 vols., Geneva 1747 (quarto) and 1748 (octavo), 
vol. i ch. 2 § 3–13. His thorough discussion of free 
choice is as insightful as it is solid. See also [Jean 
Astruc], Dissertation sur l’immatérialité, l’immortalité 
et la liberté de l’âme, Paris 1755.
§ 10.
The complex of a being’s determinations that are posited 
once its existence is posited is called a being’s nature, 
which thus consists in a being’s essence and powers taken 
together. To man’s nature, therefore, belong his organic body; 
his soul, gifted with intellect and rational; the very close 
communication of the two, § 1; the faculties of the soul, liberty 
of mind first and foremost, § 5. It also includes the propen-
sity, essential to man, to perfect himself, § 5, together with 
the specific instincts that originate from this general pro-
pensity: to obtain this or that good and to ward off and flee 
this or that bad thing. These instincts are called the first 
things of human nature par excellence.
8
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Everything that has a reason that lies in man’s nature is 
natural to man. Man’s generic nature, that is: the nature 
that all men have in common, is called humanity. So 
everything that falls to man as such is natural to him and 
belongs to humanity.
  
CHAPTER II  
OBLIGATION
§ 11.
T he representation of some good that someone intends to obtain, i.e. that someone considers a goal, is an 
impulsive cause. If that representation is distinct, it is 
called a motive; if not, i.e. if it is merely unclear or con-
fused, it is a stimulus. The representation of a bad thing 
that someone intends to avoid also comes under the impul-
sive causes, because avoiding a bad thing can be regarded as 
a negative good.
If you posit some motive for yourself, then you will also 
posit—because of the propensity to your own perfection 
which is in you—an impulse or propensity to act in a way 
that conforms to the given motive, and therefore you will feel 
a certain need to act; but at the same time you will feel that 
the opposite of such an action is nonetheless in your power 
as well. Therefore an action that originates from such a need 
still remains free and as a consequence is not physically nec-
essary, § 8; and hence a free action in as far as it is necessary 
through a certain motive is called a morally necessary 
10
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action, and that necessity itself is called a moral necessity. 
So the need, arising from a certain motive, to determine a 
free action is a moral necessity in the broader sense. And 
so it is clear that moral necessity cannot exist where there is 
no liberty of mind and therefore that although it restricts the 
exercise of liberty in some way, it does not take away liberty, 
indeed rather it supposes it as a sine qua non. 
§ 12.
Now the good whose representation is comprised in a 
motive either is a good or is not, but in any case appears to 
be one to the agent. From this it is understood that there are 
two kinds of moral necessity: one springing from the rep-
resentation of a true good, one from that of an apparent 
good. The moral necessity that is born from the representa-
tion of a true good is called a (passive) obligation. Since 
it suits human nature and hence good sense to strive for a 
true good, § 10, it follows that every obligation of man 
springs from some rational motive, i.e. one that is in accord-
ance with good sense, and therefore from a certain rational 
goal, § 11.
* An obligation is called passive to the extent that this 
notion is linked to him who is obligated, i.e., on whom 
such moral necessity lies. If, on the other hand, you 
would like to consider it in relation to him who obli-
gates, i.e. who imposes such necessity to act, you will 
have an active obligation. So in him whose free action 
is connected with some motive containing a true good, 
12
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we see a passive obligation; an active obligation is seen 
in him who connects or creates such a motive with 
another’s free action. From this it is clear that the 
notion of obligation in general, abstracted from both 
relations, consists in the connection of a (rational) 
motive with a free action; so this definition comprises 
both relations of obligation.
We owe this definition to Leibniz and Wolff; it is 
doubted by Barbeyrac in his notes to the French edi-
tion of Pufendorf ’s De iure naturae et gentium,1 and by 
Treuer in his annotations to Pufendorf ’s De officio 
hominis et civis ch. ii § 5 p. 53.2 It is defended by Emer 
de Vattel in his booklet Le loisir philosophique, Geneva 
1747.
§ 13.
A proposition (a rule or norm for free actions) stating an 
obligation, i.e. an obligatory proposition, is called a law (a 
law for free actions, a moral law in the broader sense, as 
opposed to physical laws). For this reason all laws neces-
1 Samuel von Pufendorf, Le droit de la nature et des gens. In Natural 
Law, p. 23, Achenwall says about this translation: “A French transla-
tion with notes was published by Jean Barbeyrac, 2 vols., Amsterdam 
1706, corrected and augmented Amsterdam 1734, sixth and latest ed. 
of this translation 2 vols., Basel 1750.”
2 Samuel von Pufendorf, De officio hominis et civis secundum legem 
na tu ralem libri duo annotationibus illustrati (...) auctore Gottlieb 
 Samuele Treuer, Leipzig 1734. 
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sarily consist in propositions according to which someone 
is obligated to direct (determine) his free actions.
§ 14.
An obligation and law requires i) free action of the obligated 
subject, i.e., of him who is under a certain obligation and 
law, § 11, 12. Consequently obligation does not apply 1) to that 
which is physically impossible, § 8 (either as regards determi-
nation or at least as regards execution, § 8n.); 2) to that 
which is physically necessary; 3) to him who lacks the use of 
his intellect, § 8. 4) The physically necessary actions include 
the purely natural actions, which are determined 
through man’s nature alone, § 10, independently of free 
choice. So no man is obligated beyond his (physical) ability. 
In obligations that extend to an indefinite degree we are not 
obligated to more nor to less than we can.
§ 15.
It moreover requires ii) some good that is not only apparent 
but also true, as the goal of the obligated subject that has to 
be attained by means of his free action, § 12, and therefore 
as consequent to his action. So if some obligation appears to 
originate 1) from the representation of some object as good 
that in fact is not good, i.e., that is taken for a good by mis-
take, 2) or from the representation of a good as consequent to 
some action that is not in fact consequent to it, that obliga-
tion itself is not true either, but false (erroneous, imaginary, 
fictitious). Consequent good things include the avoidance 
of a bad thing, § 10.
14
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§ 16.
Then it requires iii) distinct knowledge on the part of him 
who is obligated, both as to what he has to do (positively or 
by omission) and as to why he has to act in this way and no 
other, § 12. Therefore no man is obligated to unknown things, 
if they are considered by themselves, and no man is obliged 
beyond his knowledge. And this knowledge of the obligated 
man is supposed in abstracto as distinct, as a motive, because 
in the obligation a man is supposed who has full use of his 
intellect, § 12, and therefore a mere stimulus is excluded, 
§ 11—the kind of principle of action proper to irrational ani-
mals which are not susceptible to obligation. Not excluded, 
however, is knowledge that is partly indistinct, and conse-
quently neither is a motive mixed with a stimulus. Hence in 
concreto there are varying degrees of distinct knowledge.
* Just as all distinct knowledge of men, as finite spirits, 
contains some obscurity or confusion, so on the other 
hand a man with the use of his intellect should not be 
considered to do whatever he freely does—even if he 
acts from an impulsive cause that is mostly a stimu-
lus—from a pure stimulus in which there is no distinct 
representation at all.
§ 17.
Lastly, it requires iv) that that knowledge precede the action 
itself and its execution, and therefore that the agent be able 
to foresee (that is: know before he acts) the consequence of 
the action to be executed; for a free action, in as far as it is 
15
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conceived of as subject to obligation, is the effect of a free 
cause, § 15. To that extent obligation only applies to future 
actions and therefore it cannot be imposed on past acts as 
such, which, if only because what is done cannot be undone, 
are among the physically impossible things which do not 
come under obligation, § 14.
§ 18.
If one of two connected things is given, the other is neces-
sarily given as well; from this it is clear that he who is obli-
gated to pursue a certain goal is also obligated to the things 
without which that goal cannot be attained, i.e. to the things 
that are necessary to attaining this goal, and hence to apply-
ing remedies for it, and consequently also to removing hin-
drances to it, as much as he can, § 14.
§ 19.
Given a free action, it is also given that both of two oppo-
sites are in the agent’s power, acting and not acting, § 8; but 
given an obligation, a moral necessity is given to determine 
one of these opposites, § 11. Therefore one obligation is to 
actualizing or executing a free action; another to not 
actualizing or omitting it. The former is called a positive 
obligation, the latter a negative one. A law that obli-
gates positively is called prescriptive (prescribing, stat-
ing), a law that obligates negatively is prohibitive (pro-
hibiting, denying).
Since a positive proposition is a negation of the contrary, 
and hence a law obligating to doing something also obli-
17
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gates to omitting the contrary, a prescriptive law also con-
tains a prohibitive law of the contrary. And because obliga-
tion does not extend beyond ability, § 14, a prescriptive law 
does not obligate him who either lacks sufficient powers to 
do what the law prescribes or has no occasion to act, i.e., 
a concurrence of the circumstances necessary to do some-
thing. In the case of lacking sufficient powers there is an 
intrinsic obstacle; in the case of lacking occasion the obsta-
cle is extrinsic.
* Now the reason becomes clear why free action is dis-
tinguished into positive acts and acts of omission,3 and 
hence free deed into deed and non-deed, § 7, and why this 
distinction must be made once an obligation is given. 
For the omission of a free action, not-acting, not-doing, 
can be thought of as a free action and a free deed in as 
far as it is a consequence of liberty and in as far as it 
consists in a non-use of our faculties that depends on 
our free choice. Therefore, given an obligation to do 
something, not only that which you do in accordance 
with that obligation is your free act, but also that which 
you omit against that obligation, because omitting and 
doing equally depended on you. And to that extent the 
non-use of the powers of your body, will and intellect, 
while you could freely have executed, willed or under-
stood something external, belongs to your free acts—
3 As in § 7, Achenwall uses actio here; see the note there.
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whether for the rest you actually determined that omis-
sion freely or in any case you could have freely 
determined it in accordance with your obligation.
§ 20.
Since an obligation is a moral necessity originating from the 
representation of a good or a bad thing, § 12, the means of 
creating an obligation and law in general consists in linking 
someone’s action that is to be executed freely to some good 
or bad consequence and proposing, i.e. representing, that 
consequence to the person to be obligated. For in this way 
it will become morally necessary for him to direct his free 
action in accordance with the proposed consequence—
either a good one for which he hopes or a bad one which he 
fears. To that extent it can be admitted that every means of 
obligating consists in proposed hope or fear.
Specifically, however, 1) a positive obligation is created by 
linking either a good consequence with execution of the act 
only or a bad one with its omission only, disjunctively; or a 
good one with its execution and a bad one with its omission 
at the same time, jointly; 2) a negative obligation by linking 
either a good consequence with omission only or a bad one 
with execution of the act only, disjunctively; or both at the 
same time, jointly.
§ 21.
The more good or bad consequences, or the greater (more 
serious) the single consequences, or the more jointly the 
good and bad things are linked to both of the opposite 
20
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actions, or the more closely they are linked to them (i.e., the 
more difficult it is to separate them from the action itself), 
or the more known they are to the agent, the greater 
(stronger) the obligation and law. Hence conversely it is also 
clear what a lesser (weaker) law and obligation is.
§ 22.
Supposing that you are a man who has the full use of his intel-
lect, you cannot deny that you are not only capable of being 
obligated because of the liberty of your mind, but through 
your human nature itself are also actually obligated in many 
of your free actions, namely in those from which you can 
foresee that good or bad consequences will arise for you, § 11 
and 12. Therefore there exists some obligation that rests on you.
§ 23.
Since furthermore there is no obligation without a true 
good that someone represents to himself as the goal to be 
attained by means of his free action, § 15, it follows that of 
every obligation that may fall to a man 1) the principle of its 
existence is a true good—one that is such as we have stated 
to be required for producing an obligation, § 12; 2) the prin-
ciple of its knowledge (if it is conceived of as a proposition; 
such a principle of knowledge is called objective and com-
plex) is this proposition: perfect yourself. For by our very 
nature we are obligated to seek the good and avoid the bad, 
and our very nature makes it impossible for us to be obli-
gated otherwise. Now the use of the imperative in the prac-
tical disciplines indicates that a man is being obligated.
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Therefore perfect yourself is an obligatory proposition, it 
is a law, indeed it is the general and first principle of knowl-
edge of all obligations and laws to which a man may be sub-
ject; it is their sum, it is their center and home, so to speak.
§ 24.
Perfect yourself: therefore seek the good things and avoid 
the bad, § 5; apply remedies and remove hindrances to your 
perfection, § 18; preserve each and all of your perfections, 
preserve yourself. Seek internal good things, those of your 
soul, as well as external ones, those of the body and external 
state. Live in a way that suits your nature (human nature, 
which is not only animal but also rational), live in a way that 
suits your natural instincts, guided by reason; live a human 
life, that is to say: a life consistent with sound reason.
Perfect yourself as much as you can, § 14: so of good 
things that are each other’s opposites in such a way that 
they cannot both be attained, seek that which is better 
(intensively, extensively and long-term better); more than 
the other good things, seek the best. Of truly opposite bad 
things, avoid the worse, and the worst more than the 
others. Increase, amplify, strengthen your perfections, the 
internal and external good things. Seek your happiness, 
i.e., the complex of perfections that suit you: both the 
internal happiness (beatitude) of your soul and the 
external happiness (prosperity) of your body and exter-
nal state. Avoid things that can decrease, diminish and 
weaken your perfections; avoid your unhappiness, both 
internal and external (misery).
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Seek that which is better: so prefer a greater good to a 
lesser and vice versa a lesser bad thing to a greater one, that 
is to say: obtaining a greater good to obtaining a lesser good, 
and avoiding a greater bad thing to avoiding a lesser one. 
Prefer a greater positive good to a lesser negative good and 
a greater negative good to a lesser positive one, that is to say: 
prefer obtaining a good that provides you with a greater 
perfection to avoiding a bad thing that takes a lesser perfec-
tion away from you: a good whose perfection, which is 
bestowed upon you once the good is obtained, is greater 
than the perfection that is removed from you by the bad 
thing inflicted, and the same vice versa.
§ 25.
He who acts in accordance with the obligation and law to 
which he is subject satisfies his obligation and law, 
observes the law. If in an occurrence several laws cannot 
be satisfied at the same time, there is a conflict of laws 
(collision of laws), the impossibility to observe several laws 
at the same time. Therefore in this case in order to satisfy 
the one law it is necessary not to observe the other. He who 
does not observe a law that conflicts with another law, 
makes an exception to that law; the law that must be 
satisfied wins, and the law to which an exception must be 
made cedes to it. So if there is a conflict of laws, an exception 
is necessarily made to either of the two. And since we are 
obliged to perfect ourselves as much as we can, and hence 
to prefer that which is better, § 24, it follows that in a conflict 
of laws and obligations the stronger law and obligation wins 
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and the weaker one cedes to it, § 21. Seek that which is better: 
so in a conflict of laws observe the stronger one and make an 
exception to the weaker one, i.e., prefer the stronger to the 
weaker law. This proposition is the general law of exception 
in a conflict of a stronger and a weaker obligation and law, 
and it is called the perfective law.
§ 26.
If a free action comes under a certain category of laws, it 
either goes against one of those laws or against none of 
them. The former is called an illicit action (as regards 
the given category of laws), the latter a licit one. Further-
more a free action is determined either by none or by one 
of these laws; the former is called an indifferent action, 
the latter an obligatory one. Lastly, an obligatory action 
is either prescribed or prohibited, as it is determined 
either to be performed or to be omitted. From this it is 
clear 1) that every action that is not indifferent is obligatory, 
2) that an indifferent action is licit, whether it is performed 
or omitted, while on the other hand an obligatory action 
that is performed licitly is omitted illicitly, and one that is 
omitted licitly is performed illicitly. An action conforming 
to a law of a certain category is called an owed action in 
as far as we are obligated to make it conform to such a law. 
An action conforming to a law of a certain category in 
every way, i.e. in all determinations required by the law, is 
called a right action in the given sphere of laws, one that 
does not conform in every way is called not right.
  
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IMPUTATION
§ 27.
I f for someone there arises a good or a bad consequence from a certain free act of his, a consequence that he 
could physically foresee would come from that act for him, 
then both the act and its consequence must be attributed to 
his free choice. Hence that agent is called the free cause 
or author of both the act and the consequence. The author 
of the consequence is said to deserve it (be worthy of it) 
and such a consequence itself is called deserts, and specif-
ically a reward if the consequence is good and a punish-
ment if it is bad.
§ 28.
The judgment by which a deed’s deserts are assigned to its 
author is called imputation, which therefore consists in the 
act by which someone is deemed to deserve a reward or pun-
ishment because of a certain deed. So there is imputation 
toward a reward and toward a punishment, § 27; and impu-
tation is effective if the judgment with which it is made 
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is coupled with the actual conferment of the reward or inflic-
tion of the punishment; if it is not, it is ineffective.
§ 29.
Deserts comprise a good or a bad consequence that the 
agent could foresee would arise for him from his act, § 27, 
and that consequently has been linked with his free action 
as a motive, § 20, and therefore deserts suppose an obliga-
tion and law, § 22; thus all imputation is the conclusion from 
an act and a law and therefore consists in the application of 
the law to the act, that is to say: in a conclusion deduced 
from the act as the minor premiss and the law as the major 
premiss. Hence an act is imputable if it can be attributed 
to someone as its author and at the same time can be taken 
as subject to a certain law; in this condition of someone’s act 
lies its imputability.
* Imputation, therefore, by logical abstraction can be 
distinguished into two acts, two affirmative judgments: 
one by which some free act is attributed to someone, by 
which someone is stated to be the author of some act; 
the other by which the deserts of his act, i.e. the conse-
quence coupled with such a free act by some law, are 
assigned to him. They call the former judgment impu-
tation of an act, the latter imputation of law (of a law).
§ 30.
Because, therefore, every imputation contains a reasoning, 
prec. §, it follows that for a true imputation the same things 
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are required that are necessary for a true syllogism, and 
hence that it is required that an imputative syllogism be 
true, both as regards its substance or principles and as 
regards its form or method of concluding.
§ 31.
The substance of an imputative reasoning consists 1) in a free 
act, resulting in the minor proposition of the syllogism. For 
this act to be true, it is required that a) something has been 
done either positively or by omission, § 7; b) by the person to 
whom it is attributed—for this reason things that happen by 
pure chance, and another person’s acts as such are not imputa-
ble; c) as its author and free cause, either the efficient cause of 
the positive act or the deficient cause of the act of omission, § 7.
Since only free actions are imputable and obligation 
exists to free actions only, § 14, it follows that the things to 
which and the extent to which a person cannot be obligated 
cannot be imputed to him.
Several persons together can also be the author of an act; 
individually, they hence are a free co-cause of the act. This also 
applies to persons who contribute to another’s act, i.e., who by 
their own free act contribute something to its actuality. So it 
can happen that another man’s act to which you contribute is 
imputed to you as well. Someone who has part in the act has 
part in the imputation, all other things being equal.
§ 32.
The substance of an imputative reasoning consists 2) in a 
law, resulting in the major proposition of the imputative 
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syllogism. Therefore there must be a true law at hand, so 
that it can be applied to some act and as a consequence a 
true imputation can be made. For this reason a) if there is no 
law, there is no imputability of the act, § 29, and b) in accord-
ance with the varying categories of laws, the same act can be 
more or less imputable; imputable or non-imputable; and, 
lastly, imputable towards punishment or towards reward.
§ 33.
The form of an imputative syllogism requires a given act to 
be a case of a given law, that is: to be comprised in the law as 
the inferior proposition is comprised in its superior propo-
sition, and thus to come under the law both as regards the 
predicate—the act—and as regards the subject—the author 
of the act.
For this reason, if one of these requirements, regarding 
either the substance or the form, is missing in an imputative 
reasoning, it is clear that the truth of the imputation col-
lapses, in the way that every reasoning collapses that con-
tains a paralogism or a sophism.
Therefore whosoever wants to impute correctly must 
have sufficient knowledge of a) the act, b) the acting person, 
c) its dependence on this person’s free choice, d) the law, 
and e) the act’s and the person’s dependence on that law.
§ 34.
An action that goes against an obligation and law in any way 
is called a violation of an obligation and law and 
transgression of a law in the broader sense. For this 
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reason every transgression of a law necessarily poses an 
incorrect act, § 26, and therefore such an act in which there 
is some lack of rectitude, whatever it may be, is found out. 
The agent, however, either was physically able to remedy 
such a lack of rectitude or not; the former lack of rectitude 
of an act is (physically) surmountable, the latter unsur-
mountable. Since an act’s unsurmountable lack of recti-
tude cannot be imputed, § 14, only the lack of rectitude that 
is surmountable is imputable (towards punishment).
§ 35.
An act’s imputable lack of rectitude is called guilt (blame-
worthiness in the broader sense), and hence transgression of 
a law and violation of an obligation are divided into culpable 
(inexcusable; transgression of a law and violation of an obli-
gation in the stricter sense) and inculpable (excusable); the 
incorrect act itself is also divided into culpable and inculpa-
ble. For this reason only a transgression of a law and viola-
tion of an obligation that is culpable can be imputed towards 
punishment. From this it is also clear that only that whose 
contrary the agent both should (was obliged) and could 
(physically) have done is imputable towards punishment; and 
in as far as and to the extent that someone should and could 
have done the contrary, his incorrect act can correctly be 
imputed to him towards punishment.
§ 36.
Guilt linked with the intention to violate a law, i.e. whose 
agent acts consciously, is called malicious intent 
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(malice); guilt whose agent is not conscious in that way is 
called blameworthiness in the stricter sense. Hence the 
transgression of a law and violation of an obligation that is 
culpable and imputable is either malicious or blameworthy; 
likewise the act in which there is guilt is either malicious or 
blameworthy; and thus the agent transgressing the law who 
is guilty himself is either called malicious or blameworthy. 
The malicious transgressor violates the law while he knows 
and wills it, in as far as he must be considered to know the 
law distinctly, § 16n.; the blameworthy one not to the same 
degree, but although he is in fact ignorant of his own guilt, 
nonetheless for your blameworthiness it is sufficient that you 
do not know what you could have and should have known, 
prec. §. Malicious intent stems from a defect of the will, 
blameworthiness mostly from a fault of the intellect, hence 
the guilt of a malicious transgressor is greater than that of a 
blameworthy one.
§ 37.
A higher degree of malicious intent is the one that is con-
nected with a direct plan to violate a law. Ignorance ([and] 
error, which contains doubled ignorance) comes under 
blameworthiness, as do the other faults of the human intel-
lect that the agent could and should have overcome; but the 
faults that he either could not or is not obliged to overcome 
are free of blameworthiness, § 35. So the former ignorance 
is harmful to the ignorant person, i.e., can be imputed 
towards punishment; the latter is not. From this it is clear to 
what extent there is blameworthiness and imputability in 
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1) ignorance and mistake both of an act and of a law (of the 
law), 2) in actions from ignorance, which a man would 
not have executed if he had not been ignorant of something 
(this applies to actions from error as well).
§ 38.
Because a prescriptive law only obligates to the extent that 
one’s powers are sufficient and there is occasion to act, § 19, 
powerlessness to act and lack of occasion are not as such sub-
ject to punishment. And since a prescriptive law obligates us 
to use our faculties (powers) in accordance with the law as 
much as we can, in this case the non-use of our faculties 
while we could have used them had we wanted to, or their use 
that was less than we were accountable for, and much more 
their use to the contrary, is imputable towards punishment. 
The use of our faculties in the things that must be done for 
a certain goal, i.e. doing them, is called diligence; the 
blameworthy omission of due diligence, that is: of diligence 
to which one is obligated, is negligence; the use of our 
faculties that goes against a law is their abuse. For this 
reason all negligence and all abuse of one’s powers that could 
have been avoided is imputable towards punishment. Non-
use of one’s powers, their use that is less than it should be, 
and their abuse may sometimes come under blameworthi-
ness and sometimes under malicious intent.
§ 39.
In general, actions contrary to a law can only be imputed 
towards punishment in as far as they are free, § 27. Therefore 
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both omission of that which a law prescribes and doing that 
which a law prohibits is imputable only if it is free. Because, 
however, there are quite a few human actions that may not 
be free directly and regarded in themselves, but do belong 
to the free actions indirectly, § 9, it cannot be denied that 
there are actions that are not free in themselves which none-
theless are imputable. This includes the omission of a pre-
scribed action from a powerlessness to act that has come 
about in a blameworthy fashion. And from this the decision 
should be sought to what extent the actions of an agent who 
is drunk, asleep, ill, angry or perturbed by another emotion, 
or who acts from attitude and habit are subject to imputa-
tion.
§ 40.
An action against one’s will is an action whose oppo-
site the agent would have preferred to do if he had not feared 
some bad thing emerging from it. Actions against one’s will 
include the things someone does out of fear struck into him 
by another. An action against one’s will is an act of will and 
hence free, § 9, and therefore if something is admitted against 
the law, albeit against one’s will, it is imputable towards pun-
ishment nonetheless.
§ 41.
Since laws, § 21, as well as free actions, and lastly the con-
formity of actions with the law as well as transgression of 
the law come in varying degrees, it follows that the imputa-
bility of acts comes in multiple degrees as well, and thus that 
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the imputability of one act is greater and of another act lesser. 
An act with malicious intent is imputable toward a greater 
punishment than a blameworthy act, all other things being 
equal, § 36.
§ 42.
Once a law is posited, 1) the obligation to direct some free 
action in a certain way is posited, § 13, and 2) the imputabil-
ity of an act that is directed in accordance with the law or 
against it in a blameworthy manner is posited, § 29. Hence 
a twofold virtue or force can be attributed to any law: 1) to 
obligate with the hope of a good or the fear of a bad conse-
quence, 2) to impute by assigning the good or bad conse-




CHAPTER IV  
MORAL OBLIGATION
§ 43.
Man’s obligation to act in accordance with the will of God is man’s moral obligation (obligation of 
conscience) and hence a proposition stating such an obli-
gation is called a moral law (in the stricter sense, § 13, and 
simply in the way it is used here). For this reason every 
moral law is about adjusting our free actions to God’s will, 
contains the will of God regarding the things man must do 
or omit, and is the norm for free actions to which God obli-
gates us, § 12n.; hence it contains an obligation whose 
author is God, and thus moral laws are also known as divine 
laws.
§ 44.
Whatever is impossible, possible, or necessary for us to 
freely do because of God’s will (because of a divine law, i.e., 
in order to fulfill our obligation to the Almighty) is called 
morally impossible, morally possible, or morally necessary (in 
the stricter sense, § 11, and simply in the sphere of moral 
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laws). Thus through the moral laws some human actions 
turn out to be morally impossible, some morally possible, 
and some morally necessary. A man’s physical ability, in as 
far as it does not go against any moral law, is his moral 
ability, his right in one word (namely in the sphere of 
moral laws; otherwise it is called his moral right), the word 
“right” being taken subjectively,1 i.e., as it affects a person.2 
So an ability to act that is conceded by some moral law is a 
right.
§ 45.
Because 1) we are obligated to the opposite of that which is 
morally impossible, § 44, it is clear that we are not morally 
obligated to that which is morally impossible, and hence that 
we are not morally obligated beyond our ability both physi-
cally, § 14, and morally; as a consequence, we are only obli-
gated as much as we can be, both physically and morally, or, 
which is the same: we are only obligated to the extent that 
there is no physical or moral obstacle in the way. A moral 
obstacle is something that makes attaining a goal morally 
1 The 1763 edition reads objectiue here by mistake; it was corrected in 
the 1774 edition. Achenwall consistently uses subiectiue in this context 
in his Ius naturae (e.g. I § 22).
2 Achenwall carefully distinguishes the two meanings of ius, “right” 
and “juridical discipline/body of law”: the former is the subjective, 
the latter the objective sense. Since in English we use “right” and 
“law” respectively to convey these meanings, Achenwall’s explanation 
does not apply to the translation, but I decided against leaving it out. 
See also “Remarks on the Translation,” p. xxvi.
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impossible. Because, moreover, 2) that which is necessary 
must be possible, it follows that to whichever action there is 
a moral obligation, there is a moral ability and a moral right 
as well, § 44. And lastly, 3) given an obligation to something, 
an obligation to the things connected with it is also given, 
§ 18, and given a moral obligation to something, the moral 
ability to it is also given; from this it is clear that he who is 
morally obligated to some goal also has a moral ability with 
regard to the things required to attain that goal, i.e. with 
regard to the things without which he cannot fulfill his obliga-
tion, and therefore the moral ability to apply the means to it 
and remove the obstacles to it, in as far as they are considered 
by themselves and absolutely.
§ 46.
Human actions related to moral laws are either illicit or licit, 
§ 26, and therefore—in as far as, given the divine laws, they 
are such—they are called morally illicit or morally licit 
actions. From this it is also clear which human actions, 
given the divine laws, i.e. in the sphere of the moral laws, are 
indifferent, obligatory, prescribed, prohibited, owed, cor-
rect, incorrect, imputable, culpable, inculpable, blamewor-
thy or malicious; and why they are called morally indiffer-
ent, obligatory, prescribed, etc., actions. It is likewise clear 
what guilt, imputation and imputability are in this sphere; 
and why they are called moral guilt, imputation, and so 
forth. When discussing the field of moral laws, however, we 
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§ 47.
An action that is determined by some moral law (that is 
morally obligatory, i.e., not morally indifferent) is called a 
moral action. This makes it clear that the morality of 
an action consists in the determination by force of which 
it is either prescribed or prohibited by a divine law, § 26. A 
morally owed action is called a moral duty.
The culpable violation of a moral obligation, i.e. the cul-
pable transgression of a divine law or moral guilt, is a sin 
and is also called a morally bad (evil) action; a morally 
right action, on the other hand, is known as a morally 
good action.
A man’s attitude, and particularly his relatively intense 
promptness to conform his actions to God’s will, is called 
his (moral) virtue. Thus there can be no virtue without 
observance of the moral laws (the attitude of keeping the 
laws). Someone’s virtue, in as far as others know about it, is 
called his probity. A culpable lack of virtue in a man is 
called his depravity, and every attitude of his that goes 
against God’s will a vice. So every vice comprises the neglect 
or contempt of moral laws (the attitude of violating laws).
§ 48.
From what has been said above it is clear 1) that everything 
that a man does freely is either morally owed or morally illicit 
or morally indifferent in relation to the divine laws; 2) that 
actions that are morally illicit or morally prohibited, sins, 
actions that are morally bad, culpable or malicious, deprav-
ity, all vice, and the neglect of moral laws come under the 
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things that are morally impossible; 3) that morally prescribed 
and morally owed actions, moral duties, morally right or 
morally good actions, virtue and observance of the moral 
laws belong to the morally necessary things; 4) that all these 
things, together with morally licit and morally indifferent 
actions, come under the morally possible things, § 44; 5) that 
there is nothing between the morally illicit and the morally 
licit actions, but there are many things between the morally 
bad and the morally good actions; 6) that all morality of 
human actions comes from the divine law and from the will 
of the Almighty (which hence is called objective morality), 
and that as a consequence without the divine law there can 
be no morality of our actions. Therefore preceding the will 
of God no action of man can be called morally good or mor-
ally bad—but it is better to discuss the rest on the subject of 
moral obligation in the next chapter.
  

CHAPTER V  
NATURAL OBLIGATION
§ 49.
A moral obligation that man can know from philosoph-ical principles is called a natural obligation. 
Hence because philosophical principles include the nature, 
essence and first concept of things, indeed in general 
everything we can know by reason alone, it follows that 
every moral obligation is natural that man can know, gather 
or demonstrate from his own essence and nature, from the 
philosophical notion of God, from the natural character of 
the things in this universe, from the first concept of human 
actions, as is every moral obligation that he can understand 
without a revelation by the Almighty (a special one, that is: 
cp. § 64n.) and without faith, and every moral obligation 
that can be comprehended with reason alone, i.e., with the 
light of correct reason.
The moral obligation that is opposed to the natural 
one is called positive: every moral obligation that man is 
unable to know from philosophical principles, without a 
special revelation by God, by the light of reason alone.
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In a more general sense, if you look at the etymology of 
the word “natural,” every obligation can be called a nat-
ural obligation—and is actually called that by wolff 
and others—that can be understood from philosophical 
principles, whether it is moral or not. Then the natural 
laws and the meaning of the whole of natural law are also 
stretched to a vast circumference. But once one has 
understood the following, one will easily note how far 
that notion strays from the objective of this discipline, 
which excludes the pure rules of philosophical prudence.
§ 50.
From this notion of natural obligation we gather that the 
natural laws consist in propositions stating a natural 
obligation, § 13. Therefore a natural law is a moral or divine 
law that can be known from philosophical principles, and it 
is a proposition in accordance with which we are obligated 
to direct our actions, because of God’s will, in as far as we 
are able to know it by reason alone, § 43 and 49.
Divine laws that are not natural are called positive divine 
laws, which therefore comprise moral laws whose obligation 
man can only know from a special revelation by God.
§ 51.
The knowledge of natural laws is called natural law (law of 
nature) in the broader and objective sense,1 but often [this] 
1 See § 44n.
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also denotes the natural laws themselves taken together. 
Because in natural law other universal truths are deduced 
from philosophical principles, this discipline is part of phi-
losophy; and because its business is establishing the rules 
for free actions, it is part of practical philosophy, and in 
particular is called moral philosophy to distinguish it 
from other disciplines of practical philosophy. Its oppo-
sites are moral positive (revealed) theology and especially 
Christian moral theology, which denote the knowledge of 
the positive divine laws.
§ 52.
God exists, the maker of this universe, and consequently 
also the creator and preserver of men, on whose will and 
command everything depends, whatever it may be, as 
does any man’s existence, duration, happiness and unhap-
piness; the wisest, holiest, benignest, omniscient and 
omnipotent Being. By reasoning on from these principles 
of philosophical (natural) theology, we can understand 
sufficiently:
1) that God as the wisest Being, in as far as he gave us the 
ability to know what he wants us to do or not to do and at 
the same time the ability to act in accordance with our free 
choice in a way that either conforms to his will or not, 
 necessarily set himself this goal when making us, that we, 
not driven by some physical necessity like machines but as 
authors of our acts, in accordance with our free choice 
should act in a way conforming to his will and that we 
should adjust all our free actions to His supreme will as 
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much as we can, and consequently that we should act mor-
ally well and not act morally badly;
2) that God as the holiest Being cannot but punish our 
morally bad actions, while on the other hand
3) God as the benignest Being, who created us in order that 
we would be happy, cannot but reward our morally good 
actions;
4) that God as the omniscient Being knows absolutely 
everything that we do morally well or badly; and finally,
5) that as the omnipotent Being there is nothing he is 
physically unable to do in order to satisfy not only his 
benignity but his sanctity and himself in distributing pun-
ishment as well as reward in accordance with the deserts 
of our actions.
§ 53.
Now from this it firstly follows, in general, that in as far as 
we are able to know the will of the Almighty regarding our 
free actions, we are morally obligated to fulfill it. And to that 
extent the moral obligation of men exists.
§ 54.
Furthermore, this is also understood from it, specifically, 
that in as far as we are able to sufficiently know God’s will 
regarding our free actions from philosophical principles, 
from nature itself, without a special revelation by God, by 
the light of reason alone, we are naturally obligated to act in 
accordance with God’s will. And therefore there exists a nat-
ural obligation of men and a natural law. It is such that if 
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from it we descend to conclusions by reasoning, a number 
of specific obligations and laws are elicited, the whole and 
knowledge of which constitute natural law in the broader 
sense, § 51. For this reason natural law exists, which must be 
posited once men’s natural obligation is posited to do what 
is in accordance with God’s will.
§ 55.
There can be no doubt that all moral laws and therefore also 
the natural laws are armed with divine rewards and punish-
ments, § 52; indeed if you were to imagine them lacking 
rewards and punishments, you would remove the very exist-
ence of moral laws, because without a proposed good or bad 
consequence there is no obligation at all, nor, as a conse-
quence, does there exist any law, § 12, 13.
* Therefore I cannot agree with the opinion of those 
who claim that natural laws exist only because of God’s 
will regarding our free actions, without any regard for 
the reward or punishment that awaits us for the obser-
vance or transgression of those laws. Those who con-
ceive of such laws do not pay enough attention to 
human nature, which is such that it can only be obli-
gated through good or bad consequences. With these 
people it is the same as with those who demand man’s 
pure love for God: they impose an obligation upon man 
that he cannot receive because of his nature. So true are 
the words of the poet: “... for who embraces virtue itself, 
if you take away reward?” (Juvenal,  [Satires x 141f.])
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§ 56.
Since the rewards with which the Almighty repays men’s 
morally good actions, just like the retributions with which 
he punishes bad actions, can only be in accordance with 
God’s attributes, it is clear that in general these rewards are 
the greatest, which no reward can equal, let alone surpass, 
that is to be hoped from elsewhere for the opposite action; 
and that the punishments likewise are the greatest, une-
qualed by any to be feared from elsewhere; and that both are 
also indissolubly tied to moral actions, in such a way that no 
mortal man can disconnect such consequences, established 
for such actions, from those actions; and therefore they are 
the most certain, of whose existence we can be sure in as far 
as they are the consequences of our moral actions, and 
hence are rewards that cannot be removed and punishments 
impossible to avoid from which neither the agent himself, 
nor anyone else can free the agent, § 52.
§ 57.
Now that this has been established, it cannot be unclear that 
moral obligation is stronger than any other obligation and 
that it is the strongest of all obligations that can be conceived 
of. As a consequence in a conflict all other obligations must 
cede to it as weaker, while it alone always wins, § 21, 25. 
Therefore all other obligations admit exception in a conflict 
with a moral obligation, i.e. in a case where a moral obliga-
tion is in the way, that is to say: where there is a moral obsta-
cle, § 45. And thus it is in moral obligation only that we find 
the moral point: the determination of obligation that 
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excludes all exception, while the other obligations admit 
some exception in accordance with their essence, i.e., have a 
moral latitude (tacit restriction, essential limitation).
§ 58.
The principle of existence of every moral obligation is the will 
of God regarding a certain direction of our free actions, § 23 
and 43, and particularly of natural obligation: in as far as we 
are able to know His will by reason alone, § 49.
The (complex) principle of knowledge of every moral obli-
gation is: adjust your free actions to God’s will, § 23 and 43, 
and that of natural obligation in particular: in as far as you 
are able to know God’s will by reason. And thus this propo-
sition is the general and first principle of the natural obliga-
tions and laws, and their home and center, § 23.
§ 59.
Since that from which we can know something else, in as far 
as it is not conceived of as a proposition, is called its incom-
plex principle of knowledge (source2 of knowledge), it follows 
that anything that is such that from its nature we can conclude 
something of that which God wants us or does not want us to 
do, belongs to the incomplex principles of knowing the natural 
obligations; and that the sum of these partial principles—so, 
to that extent, nature considered in general—constitutes the 
2 Achenwall uses the word fons here, which will take on its literal mean-
ing of “well” in § 64.
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comprehensive principle of knowledge and the universal source 
of knowledge of the natural laws and natural law.
§ 60.
Act in accordance with god’s will, § 58, as much as 
you can, § 14, for the sake of your own happiness and 
hence, more in general, of perfecting yourself, § 52. Live, 
therefore, in a way that agrees with God’s perfections, attrib-
utes, aims and glory, the ends of things (with regard to God) 
and the perfections of things.
Illustrate the glory of God, perfect everything, seek the 
best of the universe, the best of the moral world, the best of 
mankind, the best for yourself, perfect yourself, preserve 
yourself. Take free actions that are determined through the 
same final reasons as the purely natural ones. 
Perfect yourself, not just as an end, but also as a means to 
God’s ends. Seek your own perfection and preservation, sub-
ordinate to God’s will, § 57.
Love God, and therefore love yourself and love others.
* Our natural perfection and obligation thus are tied 
together by a twofold knot of relations. For in accord-
ance with the different respects our perfection is the 
reason of our natural obligation, since otherwise our 
obligation would be impossible, § 12 and 7, 54n.;3 and 
3 The reference to § 54n. is incorrect, but it is unclear to which para-
graph Achenwall meant to refer. The reference to § 7 is probably 
incorrect, too.
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at the same time it also is its consequence, since our 
perfection and happiness itself must certainly come 
under God’s aims as well.
§ 61.
Now it is easy to understand which actions, given the natu-
ral laws, i.e. in the sphere of natural law, are morally impos-
sible, possible or necessary; moreover, which actions are nat-
urally illicit, licit, owed, prescribed, prohibited, obligatory, 
morally good, morally bad and evil, moral, morally indiffer-
ent, § 46; and lastly, what moral ability is in this sphere, § 44, 
what a natural right is, taken subjectively,4 natural sin, nat-
ural duty and natural virtue, § 47. A natural right, as stated, 
applies to that without which a natural obligation cannot be 
fulfilled, § 45.
§ 62.
Man’s moral duties are different according to the difference 
in object, since they may regard God more closely, or one’s 
self, or any other beings, especially other men. Hence moral 
duties, the natural ones as well, are divided into (direct) 
duties toward God, duties toward one’s self, and duties toward 
other beings, particularly toward other men.
4 See § 44n.
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§ 63.
The reason why the divine laws taken together, and particu-
larly the whole of moral philosophy also, were given the 
name of law can be demonstrated from their similarity to 
our civil laws, the body of which we call law. Civil laws are 
made by our superior and obligate us because he established 
them under fear of punishment, i.e., they have been equipped 
with penal sanction; law of that kind are called laws in the 
juridical sense or juridical laws, and the superior himself 
as the author of such laws, that is to say: as the author of 
their obligation, is known as the legislator. Now some-
one is called a superior in as far as another is his subject, 
while subjects is the term that no man can avoid to use for 
those who are obligated to adjust all their actions to another 
man’s will.
Since 1) any mortal is God’s subject, § 53, 60, and the 
Almighty hence is the superior of all mankind, and 2) the 
greatest punishments undoubtedly await men’s morally bad 
actions and those who violate the divine laws, § 56, it is clear 
that our civil laws and the divine ones have this in common 
that both consist in propositions to which because of the 
will of our superior we are obligated to adjust our free 
actions under fear of the punishment established by him; 
and therefore it is clear that the divine laws are all laws in the 
juridical sense, and that since we always call a body of such 
laws of the same type law, the name of law must deservedly 
be given to the divine laws taken together, both the positive 
and the natural ones, and consequently to moral philosophy 
or natural law as well.
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And so the reason is also evident why natural law is called 
divine law and opposed to human law: because the author 
and legislator of the natural laws is the Almighty, while the 
legislators of our other laws in the juridical sense are men. 
Hence natural law is rightly called philosophical law as well, 
because this knowledge belongs to the philosophical disci-
plines, § 51.
It should moreover be noted here that from the notion of 
the juridical law the notions of duty, punishment, obligation 
and right (taken subjectively)5 in the juridical sense are 
conceived of: in the sphere of juridical laws, 1) duty (duty of 
law, duty in general) denotes an action that is owed under a 
juridical law, 2) punishment the harm that a superior 
inflicts on a subject of his who is guilty of an admitted act 
against his law, 3) obligation the obligation of a juridical 
law as such, 4) right a physical ability in as far as it does 
not go against a juridical law.
For the rest an action that is owed under a juridical law is 
also called a commanded action, with this distinction that 
in an action as owed there is more regard for the obligated 
subject, while an action as commanded regards the obligat-
ing legislator more. An action that the legislator neither pre-
scribes nor prohibits is called permitted with regard to 
him, whether he determined nothing regarding such 
action—which action in particular is called implicitly 
(tacitly) permitted—or determined that it could licitly be 
5 See § 44n.
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either executed or omitted—an explicitly permitted 
action.
* This notion of natural law, that it consists in laws that 
originate from the will of God as our superior, is quite 
well accommodated to the understanding of those who 
study positive law, and indeed is exceedingly fruitful as 
well; so that if we proceed in investigating the like-
nesses of natural law to civil law, we may gather and 
understand by logical abstraction a rich harvest of 
most useful conclusions, that the right of the Almighty 
as the divine Creator, that is to say the most powerful, 
wisest and benignest Being, with regard to the created 
spirits, mankind in particular, is the fullest, highest 
and most absolute overlordship, from which men 
depend as natural and inevitable subjects, bound to 
unlimited obedience to him, from which the notion of 
the state of God6 and theocracy is born; and further-
more that God is the Monarch and Autocrat of this 
greatest state, that men are bound to moral and natural 
laws by force of his supreme legislative power, that the 
primary aim of these laws with regard to men them-
selves is the public good of their state, that morally bad 
actions all end up being offenses and in some cases 
crimes of lèse-majesté against God, and so forth. 
6 Civitas Dei is often translated with “City of God,” and rightly so; here, 
however, Achenwall is using civitas as he always does.
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** It suffices, however, to have touched upon these 
matters, since understanding them more fully would 
require a more elaborate explanation than can be 
undertaken on the threshold of natural law; particu-
larly that which I have indicated regarding the notion 
of superior and subject must suffice all the more as the 
real force and power of these terms, in my humble 
opinion, cannot be exhausted without first establishing 
the definition of overlordship, which itself, however, 
builds upon several other notions which either I could 
not develop at all here, or in any case it would take too 
long. Nor is it necessary to further pursue these mat-
ters here, because 1) they can be deduced more easily, 
and indeed shine out with a brighter light, once we 
have come to universal public law and that has been 
dealt with thoroughly, the discipline in which the 
proper home of these terms is found; and 2) I have 
already shown in a plainer and more practical way, if I 
am not entirely mistaken, the things that are necessary 
to establish the notion and the existence of natural law. 
For the rest, he who wishes to read more on God’s over-
lordship over men should consult, if he likes: Canzius, 
De civitate Dei;7 Burlamaqui, Principes du droit 
7 Israel Gottlieb Canzius, De regimine Dei universali sive jurisprudentia 
civitatis Dei publica, Tübingen 1744.
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naturel, partie ii, “Des loix naturelles”;8 and Hano-
vius, Philosophia civilis, part i.9
*** Let me make this one observation: since everyone 
agrees that advice is the opposite of a law in the juridi-
cal sense, I am far from embracing the opinion of those 
who believe that all of natural law and all moral phi-
losophy consist in mere advice.
§ 64.
We are able to know natural obligation by reason alone, § 49. 
God Almighty has granted us sufficient means of knowing 
the natural laws when after placing us in this world he made 
us partake of reason, by whose use we are able to draw 
knowledge of the natural laws as from a well, § 59, from our 
own nature and that of the things that lie open to our reason, 
and to perceive which free actions of ours are in accordance 
with or contrary to His most holy will. Hence the natural 
laws and natural law are called the laws of reason and law of 
reason, as opposed to the laws and law of revelation (faith), 
that is: the divine law and laws that man cannot know with-
out a special revelation by God and whose knowledge can 
only be drawn from such revelation as from a well of knowl-
edge, which is true of the positive divine laws and positive 
divine law, § 50.
8 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Principes du droit naturel, Geneva 1747.
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* A revelation by God generally signifies an act by 
which God makes manifest, i.e. makes known, his 
mind to us. Thus the granting of reason—by which we 
can perceive from the very nature of the things on offer 
the will of the Almighty concerning a certain direction 
of our free actions, and therefore perceive the natural 
laws—contains a general revelation; hence in order to 
produce in us the knowledge of these laws there is no 
need for yet another revelation, which therefore 
deserves to be called special, such as is required to 
know the positive divine laws.
§ 65.
Since natural laws are a type of laws in the juridical sense, 
§ 63, their opposite as such is the other type of juridical 
laws: positive laws, which cannot be sufficiently known by 
reason alone. And as the positive laws whose legislator is 
God are called divine laws, § 43, so those whose legislator 
is a man are called human positive laws. From this we 
understand 1) what is called positive law in general and 
human positive law in particular, 2) that duty, punishment, 
obligation and right taken subjectively,10 all in the juridical 
sense, § 63, are either natural or positive.
10 See § 44n.
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§ 66.
An act by which those for whom an obligation is established 
through a juridical law are brought to knowledge of that law 
is called promulgation (publication) of a law. A positive 
law originates from the will of the legislator, which cannot be 
known by reason alone, and therefore is a law of the kind that 
can only be known once the promulgation has been made; 
consequently, before it is published it does not obligate, being 
a thing unknown, § 16. It follows that for establishing obliga-
tion by a positive law, be it divine or human, promulgation of 
that law is required, and on the other hand it is clear at the 
same time that natural laws, knowledge of which we are able 
to attain ourselves by the use of our reason, do not need such 
promulgation, and therefore we are bound by them, although 
they have not been so promulgated.
* The promulgation of positive divine laws is included 
in their special revelation, § 64n.
§ 67.
Given a man who has the use of his intellect, his obligation 
is given to act in accordance with God’s will to the extent 
that he is able to know it, and thus natural obligation is 
given, § 53; from this it follows that natural obligation 
taken in general is
1) inevitable in as far as it is given once a man with the 
use of his intellect is given, that is to say, necessarily exists in 
him, hence is inherent to such a man simply through his 
nature, and man can neither free himself from it nor be freed 
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from it by anyone else; it is not an arbitrary obligation, which 
is given only after the will of the legislator has been made 
manifest (through special revelation or promulgation);
2) (subjectively) universal in as far as it rests on all men 
who have the use of reason; it is not a particular obligation, 
which applies to certain men only;
3) unchangeable in as far as it cannot change as long 
as this nature of man lasts, and therefore it cannot be taken 
away; it is not a changeable obligation;
4) eternal in as far as it lasts while there exist men who 
have the use of their intellect; it is not a temporary obliga-
tion, which is limited to a shorter period of time.
And so we also understand that the first natural law, § 58, 
is inevitable, universal, unchangeable and eternal; hence the 
whole of natural law itself as the sum of the conclusions 
from the first natural law is called inevitable, universal, 
unchangeable and eternal law.
1.  It should, however, duly be noted that a number of 
natural laws that derive from the first natural law are 
deduced from it only after a certain state of man is 
given, and that therefore they only obligate those 
who are in this state, and that such specific laws of 
nature consequently are inevitable, and so forth, 
under a certain condition only.
2. The doubt that may rise from a conflict of natural 
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3. If no one at all can free us from natural obligation, 
it follows that God himself, the author of all natu-
ral obligation and the legislator of natural law, can-
not achieve this either, and therefore cannot grant 
dispensation (an act of the legislator that is thought 
of as a kind of liberation or exemption from an 
obligation) with regard to natural laws; hence nat-
ural obligation is called indispensable. That this is 
rightly stated regarding natural obligation taken in 
general and regarding natural law, in as far as its 
entire reach is proven from the insight that such an 
act of God by which he were to release one or more 
mortals from all the natural laws and from nature 
law in its entirety would go against God’s attrib-
utes, his supreme wisdom in particular, § 52. But 
that God could not exempt some man from the 
obligation of a specific natural law concerning a 
particular act—which is called dispensation in the 
proper sense—is more easily assumed to be true 
than proven. Of course if you wanted to posit dis-
pensation of this kind, you would take a highly 
extraordinary matter that should be considered 
equivalent to a miracle, but would not be com-
pletely impossible even as such. Are there miracles 
in the physical world, and do we concede that they 
do not conflict with God’s wisdom? Then what pre-
vents us from wondering whether God could not 
work miracles (if it is permitted to put it like this) 
in the moral world as well?
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§ 68.
The divine punishments connected with morally bad actions 
are bad things, and to contrast them with moral badness, 
which is conceived of in a morally bad action, § 47, they are 
called physical bad things; they affect the sinner’s soul, body 
and/or external state, separately or jointly, and they can be 
conceived of negatively or positively.
Divine punishments are, moreover, either natural 
ones, whose connection with morally bad actions we are 
able to know from philosophical principles, i.e. from the 
nature of things itself, or arbitrary (positive) ones, which 
we are unable to know in that way. Of course it has been 
clearly proved with arguments from philosophical theology 
that there are fortuitous bad things (adverse fortune) that11 
God uses to punish sinners and that consequently there are 
arbitrary divine punishments.
And in the same way divine rewards also are physical good 
things that are conferred upon us because of moral goodness, 
which is conceived of in morally good actions, § 47, either 
positive or negative, either natural or arbitrary, and includ-
ing the fortuitous good things (good fortune) with which 
divine providence graces those who cultivate virtue.
11 Here and in the next sentence (after “good things”), I have chosen 
“that” over “which,” but in fact Achenwall could have meant “which”: 
in his Latin there is no marker for the difference between a restrictive 
and a non-restrictive clause.
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§ 69.
The natural rewards for our morally good actions include the 
pleasure that comes from considering our moral perfection, 
that is: the agreement of our free actions with moral obliga-
tion, the mother of joy, delight, internal satisfaction, con-
tentedness with one’s self and trust in God and his benevo-
lent providence. Vice versa to the natural punishments 
belongs the state of the sinner that is devoid of these good 
things, his disgust from considering his moral imperfection, 
that is: the disagreement of his action with moral obligation, 
which is born from a sense of moral guilt, § 35, the mother 
of sadness, grief, sorrow, penitence, terror with respect to 
divine punishment, and despair.
§ 70.
For this reason if you are aware of a morally good deed of 
yours, you will feel pleasure; if you are aware of a morally 
bad deed, you will have a sense of disgust. This awareness of 
the morality of one’s own act is called moral conscience, 
indeed in the moral disciplines is simply known as con-
science, which thus consists in the judgment with which a 
man attributes moral goodness or badness to a particular 
action of his. In as far as someone is aware of a sin that he 
has committed, he has a bad conscience; and a good 
conscience, on the other hand, in as far as he is not aware 
of a sin, or is aware of a morally right deed that he has done. 
Because awareness of right acts is thus naturally coupled 
with a feeling of pleasure and hence with internal satisfac-
tion and other agreeable sensations, while awareness of evil 
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acts is naturally coupled with a sense of disgust and hence 
with sadness and other unpleasant feelings, § 69, it follows 
that a good conscience belongs to the natural rewards for right 
acts, just as a bad conscience belongs to the natural punish-
ments for evil acts. Conscience is also understood to mean 
the faculty, or also a man’s habit, of judging the morality of 
one’s own actions.
§ 71.
Moreover the natural rewards also include morally good 
habits, by which observance of the divine laws is gradually 
made easier as well as more agreeable to the corrected mind, 
just as conversely the natural punishments include evil 
habits, by which observance of the divine laws is gradually 
rendered more difficult as well as more troublesome to the 
corrupted mind.
§ 72.
Our reputation likewise belongs to the natural deserts of our 
moral actions. A man’s (moral) reputation12 consists in 
the judgment with which others attribute to him moral per-
fection or imperfection, § 69: specifically, good reputation 
if it is moral perfection that is attributed, and bad if it is 
moral imperfection. Our good reputation wins the hearts of 
others for us and makes them more inclined to help us, 
while a bad reputation alienates others from us, making 
12 See “Remarks on the Translation,” p. xxv.
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them less inclined to assist us, indeed more inclined to do 
the opposite, and hence in the former there is an important 
aid to our happiness, just as in the latter there lies an enor-
mous obstacle to our happiness. For this reason a good rep-
utation is a natural reward for our morally good actions from 
which it results, and a bad one is a natural punishment for 
the evil actions from which it is born.
Considering our good reputation gives us internal satis-
faction, § 69, just as considering our bad reputation creates 
a sense of shame; hence that satisfaction should be counted 
among the natural rewards, and that shame among the natu-
ral punishments.
Observance of the natural laws, in as far as it produces a 
good reputation, is called respectability; contempt of the 
natural laws that produces a bad reputation, shameful-
ness (dishonor). Respectable and dishonorable can be used 
both of persons and of actions.
§ 73.
Lastly, in this consideration of divine punishments and 
rewards I do not hesitate to add a mention of our eternal 
future life after death and the greater happiness or unhappi-
ness connected with it in accordance with the deserts of any 
man’s acts in this life. For although I definitely admit that in 
a certain sense this life that we are living is the boundary of 
all philosophy and natural law, this view, confirmed more or 
less unanimously by all the peoples of every era, should by 
no means be left out here since, brought to moral certainty 
by the arguments of philosophy itself, it has great strength, 
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both to move our will concerning actions to be taken and to 
render our mind either tranquil and joyous or restless and 
sad concerning the acts that we have performed. Therefore, 
as conscience, § 70, linked with the fear of something bad 
or the hope of something good, as long as there is probabil-
ity to that hope or fear, belongs to the natural punishments 
and rewards, this expectation that we have of a future life 
after death should definitely also be counted among the nat-
ural rewards and punishments that exist in this life already, 
even though this expectation rests on verisimilitude alone 
and even though the rewards and punishments that will 
exist some time in the other life are arbitrary, because we 
only expect that they will come, but do not know which they 
will actually be.
§ 74.
The things that have been mentioned in §§ 68–73 are some 
of the kinds of divine reward and punishment that bring 
about the force to impute, § 42, of moral laws and in particu-
lar of the natural ones. Although the more particular conse-
quences of particular actions cannot be discussed here, and 
although indeed they are completely unknown, this force in 
general must be considered very great, § 57. Hence the rep-
resentation of these divine rewards and punishments in the 
mind of the agent, as so many motives, § 11, will make the 
force to obligate, § 24, of these laws very great as well. And 
since a juridical law’s authority consists in its state in as 
far as it is given due observance, it follows that the moral 
laws, the natural ones in particular, because of their very 
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great force to obligate are highly suitable to carry the greatest 
authority with those who have not been taken by bad habits 
and are not hindered in determining their will in accord-
ance with sound reason.
§ 75.
We have seen the motives for natural duties, § 11, i.e. the 
reasons that move us to do them, which must be distin-
guished from the reasons that prove those duties. Since nat-
ural duties arise from natural laws, § 47, 61, and therefore 
must be proved from them, it follows that the reasons prov-
ing natural duties must be taken from the agreement of 
actions with God’s will, attributes and aims, § 60, in as far as 
these can be known by reason alone. And knowledge of this 
agreement does convince the intellect of a natural duty’s 
truth, just as knowledge of a divine reward or punishment 
moves the will to do a duty; but because the observance or 
violation of natural duties is connected, the former with 
divine rewards and the latter with divine punishments, it is 
easily understood that the reasons proving natural duties are 
also among the moving reasons, indirectly, because of this 
connection, and thus can take on the role of motives in 
bending the will. And so it is true that the motives of our 
actions must be sought from God’s will, and that in deter-
mining our free actions we should care more for what God 
wants regarding any one of them than for what good or bad 
consequence it is going to have for us. Hence for those who 
have grown up in virtue, who are less worried about the 
particular punishments or rewards for their single actions, 
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the same thing that is their primary norm of life becomes 
their strongest motive by habit: to do that which pleases God.
§ 76.
Since for the rest it is evident that the natural laws obligate 
all those who, although in fact they do not know them or 
are mistaken regarding them, could have known them or 
could have been right, § 37, 60, it follows that ignorance of 
a natural obligation in the general sense does not excuse 
any man who has the use of his intellect, § 67, and therefore 
not an atheist either, who thinks that God does not exist, 
nor a deist, who believes that God does not care about 
human matters and does not punish the bad or reward the 
good, as atheism and deism are surmountable errors and 
therefore are imputable toward punishment by that very 
fact, because we must avoid such practical errors as much 
as we can, § 60.
§ 77.
Act in accordance with God’s will, as much as you can, § 60. 
Therefore, before other actions do, i.e. prefer in acting, that 
which is more in accordance with God’s will, do before other 
things that which is the most in accordance with His supreme 
will; prefer that which agrees more with God’s higher aim, 
rather than anything else do that which most suits God’s 
supreme or primary aim; prefer in acting that by which God’s 
glory is manifested more, that which contributes more to the 
best of the world, to the perfection of others, to your own 
happiness, § 60.
78
PROLEGOMENA TO NATURAL LAW68
If, therefore, you take the example of two actions, each of 
which considered by itself is morally owed, but which as it 
happens cannot both be achieved together, that action must 
be taken which is more in accordance with God’s will, and the 
one that is less so must not be taken. And in this conflict of 
actions 1) you will not only not be morally obligated to the 
latter, 2) but you will also be morally obligated to do the 
contrary of the latter action, in such a way that you would 
sin and take a morally bad action if you were to do the latter.
Thus an action that by itself or under a certain condition 
is morally good can degenerate into a morally bad action 
under another condition, in a conflict with another morally 
good action that is more in accordance with God’s will.
Act morally well, as much as you can, § 46, 60, so prefer 
that which is morally better, and give the highest preference 
to that which is morally best.
§ 78.
Because once a moral action is given, a moral law, obligation 
and duty is also given, § 46, if from this conflict of actions 
that we have set out you conclude that there is a conflict of 
two moral laws, obligations and duties, you have at hand the 
rule of exception: in a conflict of moral laws, that law wins 
whose observance suits God’s will more, and the other one 
cedes to it. Hence the former law must be considered 
stronger and the latter weaker, § 12. It is self-evident that this 
applies in a conflict of obligations and duties as well.
But, if we have to say how things really are, a true conflict 
of moral laws is impossible, for if it were to exist, God would 
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at the same time obligate us and not obligate us to the same 
action, and he would want the same thing that at the same 
time he did not want; indeed, as I have shown in the previ-
ous paragraph, an action that is morally good in itself ceases 
to be morally good in a conflict with a morally better action, 
so to that extent moral obligation and law ceases with regard 
to it as such, and it ceases to be a moral duty. Therefore, if in 
this case laws and duties appear to conflict with one another, 
this must be attributed to the weakness of the human intel-
lect, because this conflict of moral laws is apparent only and 
contains an error and a flaw of logic.
So there never is a real conflict of a natural law with 
another natural law, nor of a natural law with a positive 
divine law.
§ 79.
If, therefore, there appears to be a conflict of natural duties—
which may occur with duties of the same order and with 
duties of a different order—, 1) in duties of a different order, 
the lower one cedes to the higher one; 2) in duties of the same 
order, that one wins which agrees more closely with the closest 
higher duty that both duties of the same order have in 
common, § 77.
§ 80.
If you assume that a positive divine law of which you know 
for certain that it is one conflicts with a natural law, the pos-
itive law wins, because if a special revelation is given, it is 
necessarily given to supplement a defect of our reason, and 
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therefore the light of revelation is more certain and greater 
than the light of our reason left to its own resources, which 
is naturally subject to error.
* What if God had at some point commanded by a 
positive law that something should be done that goes 
against a natural law—could he, by his supreme right 
of dispensation, require men to make an exception to 
the natural law in this case? § 67n.
§ 81.
Therefore 1) specific natural laws admit of some exception 
that agrees with their essence, § 77, 79, and hence have a 
certain moral latitude or tacit restriction, § 57. 2) Since 
observance of such a law and duty in a conflict with a 
stronger one becomes morally impossible and contains a 
moral obstacle, § 44, if in this case you view neglect of the 
weaker law and duty as a defect of rectitude of the act, such 
defect will be morally unsurmountable, § 34, and therefore 
morally inculpable, § 35, indeed it is so far from being imput-
able that its contrary would be imputed toward punishment, 
§ 77.
§ 82.
Act in accordance with God’s will, as much as you can, § 60: 
therefore join forces with the rest of mankind, i.e. join the 
others to fulfill the will of God as toward a permanent goal 
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Several men joining to pursue some common and perma-
nent goal are called an association; the union (the associ-
ates’ state based on the association) resulting from it, a soci-
ety; and the individuals thus united, associates (members 
of the society). Because there is this natural obligation for 
men to fulfill the will of the Almighty with joint forces, to that 
extent we can rightly state that there exists a society of men 
that is 1) universal, since all men are its associates, and 2) 
inevitable, as they are obligated to it by their very nature, 
§ 67. So as far as God’s will extends, which must be pursued 
with men’s united forces as a natural law, extends the goal of 
the universal society and the obligation of men as members 
of this society. Therefore the goal of the universal society 
includes illustrating the glory of God, the best of mankind 
and all the other things that come under these, § 60. Society 
is also used of the group or gathering of the associates.
§ 83.
This universal society, however, is mostly taken in the 
stricter sense for the union of men to mutually promote 
common happiness, and hence the obligations, laws and 
duties that are given once this universal society is given are 
also simply called social; hence a man’s virtue in fulfilling 
this universal society’s duties is known as sociality. 
Because the object and goal of the social duties of this uni-
versal society strictly and indeed simply is the same as that 
of the duties toward others, § 62, it is clear that man’s natural 
duties toward others can be viewed as social duties. These 
duties are also called duties of sociality.
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§ 84.
Seek the best of mankind is a natural law, although subordi-
nate to the care for God’s glory, § 60. Contribute, therefore, 
to the preservation, perfection and happiness of others, as 
much as you can; be another’s means of preservation and 
perfection; do for others what you want them to do for you.
Do not do that which goes against the preservation, perfection 
and happiness of others; so omit such things as much as you can, 
that is to say: in as far as possible without violating a greater 
moral obligation. Be careful not to be an obstacle to another’s 
preservation and perfection; do not do to others what you do 
not want done to you. Do not hinder another in the things that 
he does in accordance with his natural obligation or right.
§ 85.
Unimpeded progress to attaining a society’s goal is called a 
society’s welfare. Do the things that promote the welfare 
of mankind; do not do the things that go against it. So what-
ever is such that mankind would perish if it were neglected by 
all men is naturally prescribed; whatever is such that man-
kind would perish if it were done by all men is naturally pro-
hibited, prec. §.
What is good for another is useful, and therefore use-
fulness is mutual goodness. Be useful to mankind, contrib-
ute to anyone’s benefit as much as you can, § cit.
§ 86.
To the cultivation of sociality we are 1) naturally obligated 
by God’s will, and 2) compelled by a natural human need, 
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and 3) invited by that instinct to love others that has been 
placed in us, i.e., innate philanthropy.
§ 87.
Perfect yourself and preserve yourself are natural laws, 
although subordinate to other laws that are stronger, § 60. 
So we are naturally obligated to the things without which we 
cannot be preserved or perfected, to applying the means and 
removing the obstacles to our perfection and preservation, 
in as far as this use of remedies and removal of obstacles does 
not conflict with a greater obligation; as a consequence we 
also have a moral ability or natural right to the use of the 
former and removal of the latter, § 44, 45, in as far as there is 
no stronger obligation in the way.
§ 88.
Since, moreover, there is a moral ability not only to that to 
which we are morally obligated, § cit., but also to that which 
does not conflict with any moral law, § 44, it follows that we 
naturally have the right 1) to do any duty toward God, our-
selves or others, and therefore also to any duty of sociality 
whatsoever, unless a more important duty is in the way; 
2)  to everything that is morally permitted or morally indiffer-
ent, § 46; 3) to every use of our physical abilities that is not 
morally prohibited; indeed it even follows that 4) a moral 
ability regarding the end also grants a moral ability regarding 
the things without which that end cannot be attained, so 
regarding the means and the removal of obstacles, unless a 
more important moral law is in the way.
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§ 89.
Using one’s right (exercising it) is actually taking an 
action to which one has a right. Because there is no right to 
do something unless that action is licit, § 44, anyone has the 
right to use his right if the matter is considered by itself. And 
since to my natural right corresponds your natural obliga-
tion not to hinder me in the use and exercise of my right, 
§ 84, it follows that 1) no man should be impeded (dis-
turbed) in the use of his natural right, and 2) your natural 
obligation toward me extends as far as my natural right 
extends, § 87 and 88. Duly note, however, the essential or 
tacit limitation of every specific obligation: that any man is 
obligated in as far as he physically and morally can be, § 45.
§ 90.
If a juridical law determines that a certain action, although 
it is not prescribed, must not be hindered either, it is a law 
and a kind of prohibitive law, § 19. But as it has a different 
effect with regard to him to whom it attributes the ability to 
do something licitly and with regard to him onto whom it 
imposes the obligation not to hinder the other man, with 
respect to the former it is a permitting (permissive) law, 
with regard to the latter a commanding one. In the former 
respect the law is called permitting, because by force of such 
law the legislator grants the ability to execute a certain 
action as permitted, § 63. For this reason every moral ability 
of man, every natural right, and every right in the juridical 
sense is based on either a commanding or in any case a per-
mitting law. A right based on a commanding law differs 
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from one deriving from a permitting law as a commanded 
action differs from a permitted one, § 46, 47.
* So every true moral ability has these two connected 
things, 1) with regard to God, that it supposes God to 
command or at least permit something, 2) with regard 
to other men, that it posits that others are bound to 
acknowledge this moral ability of mine to the extent 
that they are obligated not to hinder me in the exercise 
of my moral ability.
§ 91.
From the various states of men there arise various kinds of 
obligations, laws, duties and moral abilities or natural rights 
in the broad sense, § 44; hence natural law in the broad 
sense, i.e. moral philosophy, can be viewed as the whole and 
distributed into various parts.
In particular it is worthy of notice that man, apart from 
that universal society of which he is a member by his very 
nature, either lives in some particular society at the same 
time or does not. The former state of man is called the 
social state in the stricter and simple sense, the latter the 
extrasocial (solitary) state and man’s natural state 
par excellence. And so, in accordance with the matter under-
neath, social obligation, social law, social duty, and so forth, 
are also used in a stricter sense: of the obligation, duty and 
law that must be observed in the state of particular societies. 
The knowledge of natural laws that must be observed in 
the social state in the strict sense is universal social law 
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(natural social law, the natural law of particular societies) in 
the broader sense. So universal social law is the knowledge 
of the social natural duties and laws and the knowledge of 
the universal social obligations and rights. Non-social nat-
ural law as opposed to social natural law is called purely 
natural law.
§ 92.
If a society, taken as a group of associated men, § 82, is con-
sidered in general, abstracting from the things that concern 
this or that individual member, it can only be viewed as a 
single entity. Because, however, a society considered in this 
way is a whole composed of a number of individual associ-
ates that are as many parts of it, every one of which is a man, 
and every one of whom thus also has natural obligations 
and rights, it follows that the whole society considered in gen-
eral must be attributed the same natural obligations and 
rights that are attributed to any single one of its members, 
unless a reason for divergence can be demonstrated from the 
very nature of the society. For this reason so far every particu-
lar society with regard to the non-associates (non- members) is 
bound by natural human obligations and provided with nat-
ural human rights, and hence a society is called a moral 
person (mystical person, moral body, mystical body), as 
opposed to an individual man as a single person.
§ 93.
From this it is understood that the natural obligations, rights, 
laws and duties that have been established with regard to 
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individual men can be applied to any particular societies of 
men, with the exclusion of those that must be determined 
differently because of the divergent nature of the individual 
and the society. And since everyone who deals with the nat-
ural laws of particular societies uses this shortcut, it is clear 
why universal social law is defined as natural law applied to 
particular societies.
§ 94.
On the basis of the types of particular societies the more 
specific parts of universal social law can be formed.
In general a society that has other societies for its parts 
is composite; one that is not composite is simple. Thus in 
a composite society there are members or associates who are 
mystical persons; in a simple society there are no associates 
other than individual persons. All societies that can be 
simple usually come under the simple societies; and once 
this meaning is given, only those societies are called com-
posite that can only be composite and therefore are neces-
sarily composite.
§ 95.
Before the other kinds of particular societies, which are 
practically innumerable, the one that is called state is of the 
greatest interest. For nowadays practically all of mankind is 
found distributed over states, and therefore this society is 
most illustrious among the others, its study most fruitful, 
and knowledge of it that has been tested against the norm of 
the natural laws is highly useful as well as the most neces-
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sary of all. From this universal state law originates as the 
most important part and type of universal social law.
So if in a thorough examination of the natural rights and 
obligations of particular societies a discussion of state law is 
determined to be the aim, i.e. the primary goal, then it is 
necessary to first explain the societies that are relevant for a 
clearer knowledge of the state, leaving out the others, before 
one starts considering the state. The state is composed of 
families, the family or house of the matrimonial, the parental 
and the master society. The latter societies either are or at 
least can be simple; the former is a composite society, but a 
smaller one if it is compared to the state as a more compos-
ite one. Both the family and the societies of which it consists 
are known by the shared name domestic societies. From 
this another part of universal social law is conceived of: uni-
versal law of domestic societies (household law).
§ 96.
Every society in as far as it is not part of another society is 
in the natural state, § 91, is therefore called free, and conse-
quently should be viewed as a free person, § 92. Hence 
purely natural law, § 91, can be applied to free societies with 
regard to one another, i.e., free societies use purely natural 
law with regard to one another.
§ 97.
1) With regard to the families from which it coalesces, the 
state is called a greater society, and every society that is a 
composite of families is indicated with that name; 2) the 
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state is an eternal society, as it will last into the posterity of 
the united families, by their intention; 3) a free state is spe-
cifically called a nation, but more in general “nation” 
means any free, greater, eternal society. Thus it is clear that 
nations with regard to one another are ruled by purely nat-
ural law and that universal or natural law of nations is 




CHAPTER VI  
PERFECT OBLIGATION
§ 98.
Suppose that some natural obligation rests on you in such a way that if you violate it I have the moral ability 
to coerce you for that reason: that is what we call a perfect 
obligation. So a natural obligation is a perfect obliga-
tion if in case of violation it is connected with another 
man’s moral ability to coerce the violator; one that is not 
linked to such moral ability of another man is called 
imperfect. coercing another in the strict sense means 
invading his body, i.e., inflicting harm upon him by which 
his body is affected; such coercion is also known as vio-
lence, external force, and in the sphere of perfect obliga-
tions simply as force. In as far as it is applied with the 
objective that the other man, who is still resisting, should 
satisfy his obligation, it is called enforcing or exacting. But 
the word “coercion” is also used in a broader sense, which 
will become clear below.
So if there is some natural obligation to whose fulfillment 
a man can compel another even by external force, [i.e.,] to 
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which he is morally able to coerce him even by a violent 
means, [i.e.,] the fulfilling of which by another man may be 
enforced: that is a perfect obligation.
§ 99.
Hence a natural law that contains a perfect obligation is 
called a perfect law (a peremptory law, a natural law in 
the strict sense); one that contains an imperfect obligation 
only is called an imperfect law. For this reason a perfect 
law is a natural law in accordance with which someone is 
perfectly obligated to determine his free actions. The knowl-
edge of perfect laws is natural law in the strict sense (per-
emptory natural law), the word “law” being taken objec-
tively, i.e., as a body and knowledge of laws (§ 51).1
§ 100.
A man’s moral ability that is given once another man’s per-
fect obligation is given, i.e. that correlates with another 
man’s perfect obligation, is called a perfect right (taken 
subjectively, i.e., as it affects a person)2 (a strict natural right, 
§ 44, 61), and in the sphere of perfect obligations it is even 
simply called a right. A moral ability that is given without 
another man’s correlated perfect obligation is an imperfect 
right. Thus a man’s perfect right is his moral ability to 
coerce another if the latter has violated a natural obligation, 
1 See § 44n.
2 See § 44n.
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as vice versa the natural obligation that is linked with 
another man’s right is a perfect obligation.
§ 101.
It is clear from the above that once a perfect law is posited, 
two men are posited, one on whom there lies a perfect obli-
gation, the other who has a strict right. Consequently 1) every 
perfect obligation of mine corresponds with a perfect right in 
another, and vice versa every perfect right of mine corresponds 
with a perfect obligation in another, provided that in the given 
case there is no physical or moral obstacle in the way of the 
obligation, § 45. 2) Peremptory natural law can be defined as 
the knowledge of perfect rights and obligations.
§ 102.
I am naturally obliged to preserve myself, § 87, and particu-
larly, therefore, to preserve my body and my life, as much as 
I can; therefore I have a moral ability regarding that without 
which I cannot be preserved, and a moral ability to apply 
the remedies and remove the obstacles to my preservation, 
same §. Suppose that another man takes an action that goes 
contrary to my preservation; then my moral ability arises to 
remove this obstacle to my preservation. Suppose that it 
cannot be removed without applying force against the other 
man; then I have the moral ability to use force against the 
other as a necessary means to my preservation. Therefore 
there is a certain moral ability that falls to me naturally, to 
coerce him who does something that goes against my preser-
vation, in as far as there is no stronger law in the way, § 87.
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§ 103.
You are naturally obliged not to do that which conflicts 
with my preservation, § 89. This obligation of yours, if you 
violate it, is connected with my moral ability to apply force 
against you, prec. §, and therefore this obligation of yours 
is a perfect obligation and my moral ability corresponding 
with your obligation is a strict right, § 100. For this reason 
we are naturally and perfectly obliged not to do that which 
goes against another man’s preservation, and anyone has a 
strict natural right, i.e. a perfect right, to his own preserva-
tion. Thus there exists a certain natural right, a certain per-
fect obligation and a certain perfect law; if by reasoning 
from this starting point we deduce other perfect laws, 
rights and obligations, the whole and the knowledge of 
them will constitute peremptory natural law or natural law 
in the strict sense. Hence natural law in the strict sense 
exists, since it must be given once everyone’s strict right to 
his own preservation is given.
§ 104.
To cut short the doubts that may arise regarding the truth of 
a perfect natural law on not doing that which goes against 
another man’s preservation, let me remark that in the pro-
posed demonstration the following are supposed: 1) two 
men who have the use of their intellect and who are consid-
ered according to their pure humanity, i.e. human nature in 
general, which is, and in as far as it is, common to all men, 
§ 10, and who therefore are in a natural state, § 91, without 
regard for any previous acts by which one or both of these 
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men may have done some natural duty for each other, or 
violated it; 2) one of them performs some external action 
that conflicts with the preservation of the other’s life or body; 
3) the use of violence is a necessary remedy to preserve life 
or body; and 4) there is no greater moral obligation that hin-
ders the use of the right to preserve oneself and hence the 
very obligation to self-preservation in this case, § 87.
All these things having been posited, I think there is no 
doubt left that we have a true moral ability, originating from 
the natural obligation to preserve ourselves, to coerce 
another not to achieve what he has begun, hindering our 
preservation. Therefore any man has a perfect obligation, in 
as far as he can have it, not to do that which conflicts with 
another’s preservation; and any man has a perfect right, in as 
far as he can have it, to his self-preservation. For beyond one’s 
ability, both physically and legally, there can be neither obli-
gation nor right, § 45 and 88.
§ 105.
This position on the right to preservation of one’s life and 
body is confirmed 1) by the fact that God, since he gave us 
these gifts, necessarily wants us to use them to pursue his 
goals in accordance with our obligation, and consequently 
also necessarily wants us to preserve them; 2) by the fact 
that, whatever God’s aim was when he created man, in any 
case for the sake of that same aim for which he made man 
he necessarily also wants man’s preservation, and hence that 
of his life and body; 3) by the instinct to preserve oneself and 
hence the fleeing of death and destruction, which is more 
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vehement than the other propensities innate to human 
nature and which would be completely useless if its use were 
not permitted even in this case.
§ 106.
A man with regard to another man naturally has the moral 
ability to coerce him in as far as 1) the latter does things that 
go against the former’s preservation, and 2) the use of vio-
lence is a necessary remedy for his preservation, § 102. On 
this basis, the natural obligation not to do that which con-
flicts with another’s preservation is perfect; hence, just as 
from an imperfect obligation an imperfect duty is conceived 
of, so from this perfect obligation the perfect duty is con-
ceived not to do that which is contrary to another’s preser-
vation.
The other natural duties, on the other hand—duties 
toward God, toward oneself and the other duties toward 
other men—cannot be perfect, that is to say: no man can be 
forced by another to do them. Imagine that Gaius forces you 
to worship God, to perfect yourself and to promote Gaius’s 
or another man’s perfection: in that case Gaius will invade 
your body, § 98, and therefore will execute such acts as go 
against your preservation, and hence will do what he mor-
ally cannot and is perfectly obligated not to do because of 
your strict natural right, § 103. For even if Gaius’s objective 
in this case is licit and morally good, and he therefore has a 
moral ability regarding the means to it as well, nonetheless 
in fact he only has that ability in as far as he morally can, 
and therefore to the extent that these means are not illicit in 
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themselves, § 88; as a consequence this moral ability cannot 
be extended to coercive means, as they are prohibited in 
themselves.
For this reason, natural duties toward God, duties toward 
yourself and the other duties toward others that do not 
come under the duty not to impede another’s preservation, 
if you violate them still do not give another the ability to 
coerce you, i.e. cannot be exacted from you, and therefore 
all these duties, concerning men among each other, are 
imperfect duties only. Imperfect duties toward others are 
called duties of charity (of love, benevolence; some call 
them duties of humanity), as opposed to duties of neces-
sity, i.e., perfect duties toward others.
§ 107.
Since natural duties toward God, toward oneself and duties of 
charity therefore are imperfect, we are morally and naturally 
obligated not to exact these duties from anyone. This obligation 
is also confirmed by the one that requires us to cultivate soci-
ality, § 83, 84, and hence to abstain from all violence as much 
as possible; because in this case from the use of violence more 
evil would come for mankind than is to be feared from anoth-
er’s non-observance of some imperfect duty.
§ 108.
It is also clear, however, that this natural obligation not to 
exact imperfect duties from anyone is perfect as well, since its 
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§ 109.
Peremptory natural law is a kind of natural law, § 51, there-
fore it is divine law, § 63, and hence it is armed with divine 
punishments, § 54; this is something that peremptory natu-
ral law has in common with natural law in the broader 
sense.
§ 110.
Moreover, peremptory natural law is also equipped with the 
fear of coercion by the man whose perfect right is violated; 
this is something in which strict natural law differs from the 
rest of natural law, § 106.
  
CHAPTER VII  
EXTERNAL OBLIGATION
§ 111.
P erfect natural obligation has this in common with man’s positive obligation that both consist in a juridi-
cal obligation, § 65, in case of whose violation another man 
has the ability to licitly use force against the man who vio-
lates it. Thus any notions and propositions that are deduced 
from this similarity between perfect obligation and man’s pos-
itive obligation—setting aside that which is different in these 
two juridical obligations—are more general notions and 
propositions that strict natural law has in common with 
human law, and hence are applicable both to peremptory nat-
ural law and to all human law as kinds of one and the same 
more general law.
§ 112.
A juridical obligation in case of whose violation another 
man has the ability to licitly use force against the man 
who violates it, i.e. that is brought about by fear of human 
coercion, is called an external obligation. It can 
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therefore be distinguished from a juridical obligation, be 
it natural or positive, that is brought about by fear of 
divine punishment, that is to say: from a moral obliga-
tion, and to that extent a moral obligation is called an 
internal obligation. And so moral obligation and 
internal obligation are one and the same thing, but the 
former is given a new name in as far as it is viewed as the 
opposite of external obligation. Now in the same action 
internal and external obligation may coincide, although 
there also exist actions to which we are obligated inter-
nally only and others to which we are obligated externally 
only, i.e., in which there is an obligation that is either 
purely internal or purely external. An internal obligation 
is also called an obligation in the divine (internal) court, 
just as an external one is called an obligation in the 
human (external) court.
§ 113.
From these notions of external and internal obligation the 
idea of external and internal duty, § 65, is conceived of, as is 
that of external and internal juridical law, § 63, and of exter-
nal and internal law in the sense of the body and knowledge 
of juridical laws.
§ 114.
Now it is also clear what is meant by externally and inter-
nally illicit or licit, § 26. The ability to do something exter-
nally licitly is called an external right or simply a right 
(in the sphere of external laws and external law), the word 
110
91CHAPTER VII EXTERNAL OBLIGATION 
“right”1 being used subjectively for a person’s ability, which 
is connected to another man’s external obligation. So an 
external right differs from an internal right as an external 
law does from an internal law, and an external right consists 
in the ability to licitly use force against him who violates 
some external obligation with regard to us. An external 
right is often also called a moral ability, although it mostly 
does not deserve that name; at least [it does] in the sense 
that it is distinguished from a physical ability that goes 
against an external law, and because an external right and a 
moral ability usually have the same effect in the sphere of 
external laws. moral necessity, possibility and impossibility 
must be understood in the same sense in this sphere, and 
therefore also that which we call morally necessary, possi-
ble, impossible, as well as moral obstacle and other terms of 
that kind. It is preferable, though, to use the term legal 
instead of moral in the sphere of external laws, to prevent a 
confusion of notions. In that way, just as they differ in idea, 
they are also distinguished in its sign and name: moral abil-
ity, necessity, obstacle and so forth, i.e. such by force of an 
internal law, from legal ability, necessity, obstacle and so 
forth, i.e. such by force of an external law.
§ 115.
Furthermore it is clear from the above what externally 
obligatory means, § 26, and externally owed, § 47, com-
1 See § 44n.
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manded, § 63, prescribed or prohibited, § 46, indifferent, § 26, 
and permitted, § 63. An action that is externally indifferent, 
i.e. indifferent in the human court, is called an act of pure 
choice (a purely voluntary matter, a purely facultative 
right, an action that can be determined at will or at one’s 
discretion).
§ 116.
An externally illicit action is also called an (externally) 
wrongful action, an externally licit one an (externally) 
rightful one. He who is guilty of a wrongful act is 
unjust; if he is not, he is called just. Therefore 1) a wrong-
ful action involves transgression of an external law, § 34, 
violation of an external obligation, § 34, and violation of 
another man’s external right, § 114. 2) Both injustice and 
justice signify a state, sometimes of an action, sometimes 
of a person.2 3) Justice (external, as it is thought of in the 
sphere of external laws and in the human court, and in that 
sphere it is simply called justice) can consist in the mere 
absence or negation of external injustice and therefore this 
justice, as the predicate of a person, is not conceived of as 
a virtue; consequently, as the predicate of an act, it is not 
thought of as the effect of virtue either: because a person’s 
2 Achenwall uses iustus/iniustus and iustitia/iniustitia of actions as well 
as persons, while in translating I have mostly used “rightful/wrong-
ful,” “rightfulness/wrongfulness,” “just/unjust” and “justice/injustice” 
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external justice does not necessarily suppose virtue, just as 
it does not exclude it. A person’s internal justice, on the 
other hand, as it is demanded in the court of conscience, 
definitely supposes and involves virtue, § 60, 61. 4) An 
external law may be conceived of as the norm of just and 
unjust, and external law as the knowledge of just and 
unjust. 5) There exists an external right to do anything that 
is not externally wrongful, § 114, which shows the reach of 
external law.
§ 117.
Thus an (externally) wrongful act can be viewed as a certain 
kind of an act that is not right, § 26, 34. Hence 1) a wrongful 
act either involves guilt or not; the former is formally 
wrongful and imputable as a demerit, and implies the per-
son’s injustice;3 the latter is only materially wrongful and not 
imputable, and hence an act that is inculpable in the sphere 
of external law, and excludes injustice of the person because 
it involves the sole wrongfulness of the act. 2) A wrongful 
act in which there is guilt can be culpable, malicious or 
blameworthy (in the strict sense), § 36. A wrongful act with 
malicious intent can be called misdeed in one word, which 
agrees with normal usage. He who is guilty of a misdeed is 
called malfeasant.
3 See § 116n.
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§ 118.
A wrongful action is also known as a wrong, which thus 
consists in transgression of an external law, in the violation 
of an external obligation and in the violation of another’s 
external right, § 116. Furthermore a wrong either involves 
guilt or does not, and in the former case again it either 
involves blameworthiness or malicious intent, prec. §, 
whence a wrong is either culpable or inculpable and the 
former is either blameworthy or malicious. A culpable wrong 
is an injury in the broader sense, which thus supposes a 
violation of another man’s right in which there is guilt as 
well. So there is wrong without injury, and every injury is 
either blameworthy or malicious; both a wrong and an injury 
can be an act of commission or one of omission, § 7. 
As for the rest, from the above it is self-evident that once 
an external law is given, an external obligation is given not 
to act (externally) wrongfully, to cultivate (external) justice, 
not to commit a misdeed, not to wrong, not to commit 
injury. For this reason, the following propositions can be 
regarded as the first principles and general laws of all exter-
nal law: do not act wrongfully, cultivate justice, wrong no one, 
and so forth.
§ 119.
If you have an (external) right to use some object and to 
exclude others from its use, in the juridical disciplines that 
object is par excellence called your own. Using is actualizing 
utility in general, and excluding another man from use is 
achieving that another man is unable to use some object, i.e. 
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that he abstains from its use, i.e. preventing another from 
using it. Therefore that which someone can rightfully use to 
the exclusion of others is his own from the perspective of 
that person and in accordance with the varying perspective 
of persons is called my, your, another’s or our own.4
Now his own (proper) is also used of the right itself that 
someone has to use a certain object to the exclusion of 
others; indeed, every right regarded in itself that someone 
has while excluding others is called his proper right.5 And 
then the use of one’s proper right is the same as the exercise 
of the right, in such a way that you are said to use your 
proper right if you do that which you have a right to do, to 
the exclusion of others; and you are said to exclude another 
man from the use of your right if you prevent the other from 
doing that which he is prohibited from doing by virtue of 
your right.
§ 120.
If someone does something that goes against another 
man’s right to that which is his own, or simply something 
that conflicts with another’s proper right, he does not 
give the other man his own, he disturbs another’s 
proper right. The following phrases also belong here: to 
invade, to remove, to diminish, to take away that which is 
another man’s own. He who does not do something like 
4 Achenwall of course adds vestrum: “your” (plural).
5 See “Remarks on the Translation,” p. xxvii-xxviii.
116
PROLEGOMENA TO NATURAL LAW96
that, or does that which does not conflict with such right 
of another, gives the other man his own, grants him his 
proper right. The following locutions likewise belong 
here: to leave another what is his, to abstain from that which 
is another’s. Both can be done either by commission or by 
omission.
§ 121.
Once my external right is given, for another man an exter-
nal obligation is necessarily given, § 114; from this it is clear 
that once some object is given as my own, or my proper 
right is given, the other man has the obligation not to do 
anything that conflicts with my right. From this the obliga-
tion is deduced to give each his own (and his own right), to 
abstain from that which is another’s, not to take away any 
man’s proper right, to hinder no one in the use of his proper 
right, as the general principles of the external obligations of 
external law. Therefore 1) every act by which another is not 
given that which is his own, by which another’s proper right 
is taken away, by which he is disturbed in his right, is a 
wrongful action and a wrong, § 116, 118. 2) A person’s exter-
nal justice may consist in his mere abstinence from that 
which is another man’s, § 116. 3) He who uses his own right 
does not wrong, does not injure anyone and does not act 
with malicious intent.
§ 122.
My proprietorship in the broader sense is nothing else 
than the right that I have to exclude another from the use of 
117
97CHAPTER VII EXTERNAL OBLIGATION 
what is mine, and hence from an act by which my right is 
disturbed, prec. §; a thing regarding which proprietorship 
falls to someone is owned by him (his property) in the 
broader sense. Because such a right of exclusion (right to 
prohibit) goes with all that is one’s own, § 119, all that is 
someone’s own comprises proprietorship and is owned. From 
this it is understood what someone’s own (proper) right is, 
and that every right that is someone’s own is a proper right 
and comprises proprietorship, same §.
§ 123.
For some object to be called Gaius’s own, it is required 1) 
that it is useful to Gaius, 2) that Gaius has the right to use it 
and thus is not prohibited by an (external) law from using 
it, 3) that Gaius can legally (as no external law forbids it) 
exclude another man from its use, and 4) that if another 
man hinders Gaius in that use or exclusion, Gaius can 
legally coerce the other man not to hinder him.
§ 124.
From this it is also clear that that which is Gaius’s own is a 
useful object regarding which Gaius has the right of use, 
while another man has the obligation to abstain from its 
use. Indeed because every right necessarily has for its objec-
tive some utility, whatever it may be, for him who has that 
right, in such a way that a right that is completely useless is 
not a right, that which is someone’s own can also be defined 
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§ 125.
Although everything that is someone’s own is owned, § 122, 
it can either be owned by one person alone or by several 
people at the same time; in the former case it is called 
owned in the stricter sense, in the latter common. Hence 
my proprietorship (of my right, of that which is my own) 
in the stricter sense is proprietorship that falls to me alone, 
while communion (of a right, of that which is one’s own) is 
proprietorship in the broader sense that falls to several 
people at the same time.
§ 126.
The harm that a wrong causes the wronged party, i.e. that is 
felt by the wronged party because of the wronging party’s 
action as such, is called loss. Therefore 1) from every wrong 
there arises a loss for the man wronged, § 123; 2) harm that 
arises for a man in such a way that it cannot be ascribed to 
another’s action as an effect, is not loss, and therefore acci-
dental loss does not exist; 3) the harm that is caused for a 
man by another’s action while that action is not wrongful 
and is not a wrong, likewise does not classify as a loss. Such 
harm is denoted with the word damage.
§ 127.
A loss is the effect of a wrong on the wronged party, 
prec. §. Hence, based on the types of cause, it is distin-
guished 1) with respect to the person causing or inflicting 
the loss, into a culpable loss (caused by injury, § 118) and an 
inculpable one (caused without injury), and a culpable loss 
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into a blameworthy and a malicious one. 2) With respect to 
the act and the law, into a loss of commission and one of 
omission.
§ 128.
The wronged party with regard to the wronging party has 
the right not to have his proper right taken away by the 
wronging party, hence not to have a loss inflicted upon him, 
and consequently, if some loss has been caused, that it 
should cease; for otherwise his proper right would be use-
less. So to this right of the wronged party corresponds the 
(external) obligation of the wronging party to ensure that 
the loss he has caused the other man ceases, which is called 
the obligation to restore a loss. Thus given a wrong the 
obligation is given for the wronging party to restore the loss to 
him to whom it was caused, and therefore the wronged party 
has the right to demand restoration of the loss caused to him 
by the wronging party.
§ 129.
From the notion of external law that we have established we 
could derive several other notions and propositions that 
human law and natural law have in common. But that which 
remains should be investigated in the treatise on natural law 
in any case, and once it has been thoroughly dealt with in its 
proper place, it can easily be extended by means of logical 
abstraction and thus transferred to use in all human law; 
therefore, to avoid repetition and the impression of being 
too occupied with rather general and purely hypothetical 
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matters, the above can suffice. On the basis of what I have 
deduced, however, I would like to remark that the primary 
and ultimate goal of all external law lies in this, that every-
one should grant each his proper right, while the means to 
this end consists in the fear of coercion as a motive, by which 
everyone is obligated to abstain from what is another’s; but 
if this fear does not suffice to produce this effect, it consists 
in the act of coercion itself, i.e. in the use of the right to coerce, 
so that the other man fulfills his obligation to me and I am 
given my right. From this it is understood what the obligat-
ing force of external laws is and what their imputing force, 
§ 42, and that the former is their principal force or virtue 
and the latter the subsidiary one.
  
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PERFECT OBLIGATION AS 
EXTERNAL OBLIGATION
§ 130.
A n external obligation can be either natural or positive, § 111 and 49; a perfect obligation is a natural external 
obligation, § 98 and 49. Because a perfect obligation thus is 
a kind of external obligation, and peremptory natural law 
hence is a kind of external law, it follows that the principles 
of external law can be applied to peremptory natural law in 
as far as it is viewed as external law. So if the terms of exter-
nal law, e.g., illicit, licit, prescribed, prohibited, permitted or 
wrongful action, wrong, injury, one’s own, proprietorship, loss, 
and so forth, are applied, they must be considered in as far 
as they are such by force of a perfect natural law. Hence in 
natural law these terms must be given the addition naturally 
or natural, to distinguish them from the ones occurring in 
positive external law, which are thought of there as they are 
by force of a positive external law. Thus a wrong, for instance, 
that is such by force of a perfect natural law is a natural 
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wrong; the harm to the wronged party from a natural wrong 
is a natural loss; something to which someone has a nat-
ural proper right is his natural own; whatever is licit, pro-
hibited, permitted or wrongful by a perfect natural law is 
naturally licit, prohibited, permitted or wrongful. If this 
addition to terms of external law in the discussion of per-
emptory natural law is not always explicitly made, it should 
nonetheless be understood to be there.
§ 131.
If, furthermore, by a correct reasoning and on the basis of 
the natural law on not hindering the preservation of others, 
something can be deduced as one’s own, a wrong, loss, and 
so forth, then it is clear that the principles of these notions 
can also be applied to it in peremptory natural law. And 
because an inference from genus to species is valid and cer-
tain, we understand to what extent the following proposi-
tions must be admitted as principles of natural law, and 
especially as principles of perfect obligations, i.e., as perfect 
laws: wrong no one, cultivate justice, § 118, give each his own, 
§ 124, do not take away anyone’s proper right, abstain from 
that which is another’s, § 121, do not cause anyone a loss, 
restore the loss that you have caused, § 128.
§ 132.
Now it follows from the above that by the same token the 
following theses must be admitted as principles of natural 
law, and especially as principles of the strict natural rights: 
anyone has a strict natural right not to be wronged, not to 
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have injury inflicted upon him, to be granted that which is his, 
not to have his proper right taken away, not to be disturbed or 
hindered in the use of his right, not to have any loss caused to 
him, that any loss caused to him be restored by the person 
who caused it, prec. §. And so any man’s natural right to 
preservation of his body and life, which I have demonstrated 
in § 102 and 105, by hypothesis can be thought of more gen-
erally as any man’s natural right to preservation of all his nat-
ural rights.
Because, furthermore, an external right consists in the 
ability to act in as far as it does not go against some external 
law, § 114, it follows that there naturally exists an external 
right to do everything that does not conflict with another 
man’s right to preservation,1 that does not go against some 
perfect law, that is indifferent by perfect law, and by which 
another man is not wronged naturally. And so the concept is 
born of a natural external right and, as a consequence, of a 
perfect right as external right, that has a very wide reach. 
This right often is definitely not a moral ability, but contains 
a moral impossibility and a sin; but with regard to you, it 
should nonetheless be viewed naturally as an external right 
that you should acknowledge as such, because you have to 
acknowledge your perfect obligation not to hinder another 
by force in doing these things, and consequently you have 
to acknowledge the other man’s right corresponding to this 
1 Sui in sui conservatio has a double meaning, as it is the genitive of se 
(oneself) and of suum (that which is one’s own). This paragraph and 
the next make it clear that Achenwall in fact means both.
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obligation, which is strict, being external, and which arises 
indirectly from your obligation. For you it can suffice that 
this obligation of yours is a true obligation that agrees with 
the will of God and the welfare of the universal society, and 
hence with the duties of sociality.
§ 133.
Thus the goal of peremptory natural law as external law is 
that we should preserve ourselves and everything that is 
naturally ours, and hence that we should not be naturally 
wronged; the means to this end lies in coercion, which we 
can licitly use against a wronging party by virtue of our nat-
ural right, § 103, 129. From this the natural right is deduced 
to use force against him who wrongs us, that is: the right to 
defend oneself and that which is one’s own; there-
fore also the right to repel with force the force of him who 
wrongs us, or to resist him who tries to wrong us; indeed 
also the right not to allow another man to begin actually 
wronging us, and thus the right to use force against him from 
whom a wrong threatens us, i.e. is to be feared with proba-
bility, and to resist him.
§ 134.
A man threatens a wrong if by an act he betrays the 
intention (intent, plan) to wrong, that is: if he manifests it 
with an external act. So it is licit to use force against one who 
threatens a wrong, prec. §. To that extent the intent to 
wrong—when it is manifested—is the equivalent of an actual 
wrong. Now he who is threatened with a wrong is in 
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danger, which denotes a state of imminent harm, and the 
opposite of danger is security, a state free of danger: there-
fore from anyone’s right against one who threatens a wrong 
follows anyone’s natural right to avert danger (of a wrong) 
with force and to protect his security (from a wrong), which 
is succinctly called the natural right to security and con-
sists in the right to use force against him who threatens a 
wrong against us.
§ 135.
Coercion or violence for the reason that, and in as far as, it 
is a necessary remedy to preserve ourselves is naturally licit, 
§ 106. Hence it follows that for the same reason and to the 
same extent it is also licit to invade and take away anything 
that is the wronging party’s own. And so the more general 
notion is conceived of coercion, force, violence in the broader 
sense, cp. § 98, as it is thought of in all external law: meaning 
any act by which another man is not given his own or his own 
right. Thus coercion and force in this broader meaning as the 
act of the wronged man against the wronging one in order 
to preserve himself and that which is his own, naturally is 
licit and rightful; but any other, that is: any that is exercised 
against one who does not wrong, is naturally illicit and 
wrongful.
§ 136.
For the rest, since coercion can be viewed as a rather harsh 
remedy, it is self-evident that the use of milder means to pre-
serve oneself and that which is one’s own not only is natu-
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rally permitted, but also, in as far as it is sufficient to attain 
this goal and one’s right, is prescribed, and violence prohib-
ited, § [102–107].2 For this reason the right that one naturally 
has to coerce the wronging party also comprises the right to 
protect oneself and that which is one’s own against the wrong-
ing party by any milder means whatsoever and by inflicting 
any lesser harm whatsoever.
§ 137.
Violence is rightfully exercised against one who wrongs. If 
the wrong is thought of as culpable, § 118, and consequently 
as morally imputable toward punishment, the violence that 
we use against the wronging party should be considered a 
kind of imputation toward punishment—an effective imputa-
tion, to be precise. And so it is clear that peremptory natural 
law for naturally wrongful acts establishes imputability 
toward coercion that is to be pursued by the wronged man as 
a specific type of natural punishment, § 109, that is proper to 
peremptory natural law, since the other natural duties 
cannot be enforced and hence the other naturally evil acts 
are not subject to another man’s coercion, § 106, 109.
§ 138.
Thus not only God as legislator imputes a culpable wrong, 
but the man whose right was violated can also impute it: 
2 The paragraph number is missing in the Latin edition; it probably was 
one of these.
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man by coercing, God by punishing in the stricter sense. 
Imputation by God is called imputation in the divine 
court (in the heavenly court, in that of conscience, the 
internal court, divine imputation), and imputation by man 
imputation in the human court (in the earthly court, 
the external court, human imputation). Imputation in the 
divine court is infinitely superior to human imputation, 1) 
because the former also extends to internal acts, while the 
latter is limited to that which can be known by another man 
and consequently to certain external acts; 2) because divine 
imputation is always true, effective and in proportion to the 
acts, while human imputation on the other hand is often 
erroneous, ineffective and out of proportion.
§ 139.
There also exists, however, a naturally rightful coercion that 
is not imputation. Take, for instance, an inculpable wrong, 
§ 118, i.e. a wrongful act free of guilt, e.g., by a man who 
lacks the use of his intellect or who finds himself in a case of 
conflict of a perfect duty with a greater moral duty, § 104. 
Because such an act is inculpable, § 117, it cannot be imputed 
toward punishment. Nonetheless in this case the wronged 
man is allowed to use violence as a necessary remedy to 
preserve himself and his right to coercion remains intact, 
since it does not originate from the morally bad action of 
the wronging party but from the wronged party’s obligation 
to preserve himself, § 102. For this reason there exists a nat-
urally rightful coercion that does not come under imputa-
tion.
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§ 140.
As for the rest, peremptory natural law is completely differ-
ent from the rest of natural law in this respect that observing 
the duties of conscience and the pursuit of virtue are under-
stood to be equipped with the greatest and most certain 
rewards to be hoped from divine providence, § 56, while 
observance of merely external duties and the pursuit of 
merely external justice 1) with regard to God not only is 
unworthy of rewards but, in as far as it is linked with the 
neglect of virtue and the duties of conscience, is also subject 
to the greatest and most certain divine punishments, § 56; 
2) with regard to other men, in as far as that observance is 
viewed as pure abstinence from that which is another man’s 
and from externally wrongful acts, does not contribute any-
thing but freedom of imputability toward coercion, i.e. the 
exemption from punishment of peremptory natural law, 
that is: impunity. To that extent peremptory natural law 
lacks rewards.
§ 141.
If, moreover, peremptory natural law is thoroughly dis-
cussed as external law, 1) external actions are taken into 
account only, leaving out the internal ones, because purely 
internal actions cannot be known to another man, 2) in as 
far as they can be known to another man, so in as far as 
their truth can be made certain, that is to say: can be 
proved. In human actions, though, moral certainty suffices 
even for proving, since demonstrative certainty is impos-
sible to have.
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§ 142.
Finally some things remain to be explained about the con-
flict of duties as regards peremptory natural law. If a duty of 
necessity that is owed to one man conflicts with a duty of love 
owed to another, the former will win to the extent that, all 
other things being equal, the law that is equipped with the 
other man’s right of coercion is stronger than the one that 
lacks this right, § 21.
§ 143.
There is, however, also a conflict of a duty of necessity with 
the preservation of life: when a duty of necessity cannot be 
fulfilled without loss of the life of the man who is obliged to 
do such duty. This state of a man in as far as he finds himself 
in a conflict of a duty of necessity with the preservation of 
his life is called an extraordinary state (irregular state, 
case of need, ultimate need, extreme danger); its opposite is 
a state that is free of such conflict, the ordinary (regular) 
state.
§ 144.
Man’s life is his fundamental perfection: when it is taken 
away, all the other perfections, whichever they were, with 
which he was provided in this world are taken away as well, 
and so his very humanity ceases to be. For this reason the 
loss of life must be viewed as the greater evil compared to the 
loss of many other human perfections. To that extent the obli-
gation to preserve one’s life, i.e. to flee death and destruction, 
is stronger than the obligation to do duties of necessity, and 
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the law do not perish is more important than the law do not 
violate perfect duties; so in a conflict the former wins and the 
latter cedes to it. Thus it is clear that perfect duties admit 
some exception in an extraordinary state and hence admit 
some moral latitude, § 57. To that extent the following is 
true: necessity knows no law and every way to ensure one’s 
safety is honorable.
§ 145.
For this reason a man in an extraordinary state naturally has 
a certain moral ability to ignore a perfect duty in order not 
to perish, which is called the privilege of necessity.
§ 146.
It should be noted, however, that the privilege of necessity 
cannot be claimed if there is no extraordinary state, and 
thus if 1) not the loss of his life, but only that of a lesser per-
fection is connected with the fulfillment of a perfect duty, or 
2) his life and the perfect duty do not conflict in such a way 
that the former cannot be preserved in any way unless the 
latter is violated, that is to say: unless the neglect of such duty 
is a necessary and hence the only means to avoid his perish-
ing.
* Therefore 1) a merely apparent and supposed extra-
ordinary state does not provide an occasion for the 
privilege of necessity, nor is it necessary to claim that 
privilege if 2) the matter is about fulfilling a duty of 
charity, nor if 3) one’s life must be protected against one 
133
111CHAPTER VIII PERFECT OBLIGATION AS EXTERNAL OBLIGATION 
who wrongs, because the force that the wronged party 
uses against the wronging party is not violation of a 
duty but the exercise of a proper right, § 135.
§ 147.
For the rest, supreme happiness does not lie in this life that 
we live, § 73, and God’s ultimate aim cannot lie in its preser-
vation, § 60; hence the obligation to preserve this life is not 
the highest obligation either, but is entirely subordinate to 
other natural duties that are stronger, § 60. Therefore the 
privilege of necessity is likewise restricted by this natural law: 
in as far as there is no greater obligation in the way. From this 
it is clear that it is possible for a perfect duty to defeat the 
obligation to preserve one’s life: if that duty turns out to be 
connected with some greater obligation.
§ 148.
Thus it is understood from the above to what extent there is 
a privilege of necessity and to what extent its use is morally 
and naturally licit, that is: not contrary to God’s will in as far 
as it can be known by reason alone. To that extent the priv-
ilege of necessity is rightly considered to be one of man’s moral 
and natural rights in the broader sense, § 87.
§ 149.
Because, however, a perfect duty and therefore another 
man’s strict natural right is violated by the use of the privi-
lege of necessity, every action that is undertaken by virtue of 
the privilege of necessity belongs to the wrongful actions and 
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to the wrongs, § 130. Therefore from the point of view of 
external natural law and from that of him against whom it is 
exercised the privilege of necessity cannot be called a right, 
indeed that man as the wronged party has the right to resist 
and to defend himself and that which is his own, § 133, and to 
demand restoration of the loss caused to him, § 132. It can 
suffice, however, that such an action undertaken on the 
basis of the privilege of necessity is a wrong that is free of 
guilt and that cannot be morally imputed, briefly put: an 
inculpable wrong, § 117, 118; because a lesser obligation is 
suspended by a greater one if and in as far as it conflicts with 
the latter, and a moral obstacle makes it impossible to cor-
rect the lack of rectitude of the act that is seen in this case.
Therefore the extraordinary state does not turn a per-
fect duty into an imperfect one, as some think.
The difference between a culpable and an inculpable 
wrong as to juridical effect will be shown in the treatise 
on Natural Law, section iii.
  
Emendations to the Latin Text
§ 7, l. 5: concipiatursi should be si concipiatur
§ 9, antepenultimate l.: Videsis should be Videbis
§ 10, p. 9, l. 2: 4 should be 5
§ 15, l. 9: nepraesentatione should be repraesentatione
§ 18, l. 1: eonnexorum should be connexorum
§ 19, p. 18, last line: non vsus should be non-vsus
§ 24, l. 6: couenienter should be conuenienter
§ 27, l. 7: e auctor should be auctor
§ 29, penult. l.: imputionem should be imputationem
§ 31, p. 29, last line: funt should be sunt
§ 31, p. 30, l. 4: liberta should be liberae
§ 44, p. 40, l. 2: obiectiue should be subiectiue (corrected in 1774)
§ 48, p. 44, l. 14: Numenis should be Numinis
§ 60, l. 4: connenienter should be conuenienter
§ 63, p. 61, l. 7–8: Ciuilii should be Ciuili
§ 63, p. 61, l. 14–15: plenissimu should be plenissimum
§ 63, p. 62, l. 11: euoluer should be euoluere
§ 75, p. 77, l. 9: factiendum should be faciendum
§ 90, p. 90, note, l. 4: saltim should be saltem
§ 107, l. 2: officio should be officia
§ 107, p. 106, last l.: vuiolentia should be violentia
§ 120, l. 8: iure should be iuri
§ 128, l. 6: quo should be quod
§ 130, l. 2: iii should be 111
§ 132, p. 125, l. 8: conseruationm should be conseruationem
§ 135, l. 8: 89 should be 98
§ 136, l. 7: supply paragraph number (see note ad loc.) 
§ 138, l. 12: delete §
§ 149, l. 18: perfectum should be perfecto
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Index of Subjects, Latin-English
This is the original Latin index together with the English translation. 
Thus, this index doubles as a glossary.
References are to the paragraph numbers. Mistakes in the original 
index have been tacitly corrected.
Abusus facultatum suarum, abuse of one’s faculties, § 38
Actio commissiva, act of commission, positive act, § 7
actio debita, owed action, § 26
actio ex ignorantia, action from ignorance, § 37
actio externa, external action, § 1
actio externe debita, externally owed act, § 115
actio externe iussa, externally commanded act, § 115
actio externe obligatoria, externally obligatory act, § 115
actio externe permissa, externally permitted act, § 115
actio externe praecepta, externally prescribed act, § 115
actio externe prohibita, externally prohibited act, § 115
actio honesta, respectable action, § 72
actio humana, human action, § 7
actio illicita, illicit action, § 26
actio indifferens, indifferent action, § 26
actio inhonesta, dishonorable action, § 72
actio iniusta (externe), (externally) wrongful action, § 116
actio interna, internal action, § 1
actio invita, action against one’s will, § 40
actio iussa, commanded action, § 63
actio iusta (externe), (externally) rightful action, § 116
actio libera, free action, § 7
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actio libera commissiva et omissiva, free positive act and act 
of omission, § 7, § 19n.
actio libera ratione determinationis et exsecutionis, free 
action as regards determination and as regards 
execution, § 8n.
actio licita, licit action, § 7
actio mere naturalis, purely natural action, § 14
actio minus recta, action that is not right, § 26
actio moralis, moral action, § 47
actio moraliter bona, morally good action, § 47
actio moraliter culpabilis, morally culpable action, § 46
actio moraliter culposa, morally blameworthy action, § 46
actio moraliter debita, morally owed action, § 46
actio moraliter dolosa, morally malicious action, § 46
actio moraliter illicita, morally illicit action, § 46
actio moraliter imputabilis, morally imputable action, § 46
actio moraliter inculpabilis, morally inculpable action, § 46
actio moraliter indifferens, morally indifferent action, § 46
actio moraliter licita, morally licit action, § 46
actio moraliter mala, morally bad action, § 47
actio moraliter minus recta, morally incorrect action, § 46
actio moraliter necessaria late, morally necessary action in 
the broad sense, § 11
actio moraliter necessaria stricte, morally necessary action in 
the strict sense, § 44
actio moraliter obligatoria, morally obligatory action, § 46
actio moraliter prava, morally evil action, § 47
actio moraliter praecepta, morally prescribed action, § 46
actio moraliter prohibita, morally prohibited action, § 46
actio moraliter recta, morally correct action, § 46
actio moraliter turpis, morally dishonorable action, § 72
actio negativa, negative act, § 7
actio obligatoria, obligatory action, § 26
actio obligatoria praecepta et prohibita, prescribed and 
prohibited obligatory action, § 26
actio omissiva, act of omission, § 7, § 19n.
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actio permissa, permitted action, § 63
actio permissa explicite, implicite et tacite, explicitly, 
implicitly and tacitly permitted action, § 63
actio physice necessaria, physically necessary action, § 8
actio positiva, positive act § 7
actio prava, evil action, § 46
actio privativa, act of omission, § 7
actio recta, right action, § 26
Actus meri arbitrii, act of pure choice, § 115
Aeternitas obligationis naturalis, eternity of natural 
obligation, § 67
Alienum, that which is another’s own, § 119, § 124
Animae humanae facultas appetitiva, appetitive faculty of the 
human soul, § 2
eaque inferior et superior, higher and lower appetitive faculty 
of the human soul, § 3
animae humanae facultas cognoscitiva, cognitive faculty of 
the human soul, § 2
eaque inferior et superior, higher and lower cognitive faculty 
of the human soul, § 3
animae humanae imperium in se ipsam, the human soul’s 
overlordship over itself, § 9n.**
animae humanae regimen in corpus, the human soul’s 
control of the body, § 9n.**
Anomia, transgression of a law, § 34
Antinomia, collision of laws, § 25
Arbitrium, choice, § 6
arbitrium liberum, free choice, § 6
Atheus, atheist, § 76
Auctor, author, § 27
Auctoritas legis iuridicae, authority of a juridical law, § 74
Beatitudo, beatitude, § 24
Bonum morale seu moraliter bonum, moral good thing, i.e., 
that which is morally good, § 46, § 68
bonum physicum, physical good thing, § 68
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bonum physicum positivum et privativum, positive and 
negative physical good, § 68
Casus necessitatis, case of need, § 143
Caussa impulsiva, impulsive cause, § 11
Caussa libera, free cause, § 27
Coactio late, coercion in the broad sense, § 135
Coactio et cogere stricte, coercion in the strict sense, § 98
Collisio legum, collision of laws, conflict of laws, § 25
Commune, that which is common, § 125
Communio iuris, communion of a right, § 125
Concaussa facti, co-cause of an act, § 31
Concurrere ad factum, to contribute to an act, § 31
Conscientia moralis, moral conscience, § 70
eaque bona et mala, good and bad moral conscience, § 70
Conscientiae obligatio, obligation of conscience, § 43
Consociatio, association, § 82
Corpus morale, moral body, § 92
Corpus mysticum, mystical body, § 92
Culpa late, blameworthiness in the broad sense, § 35
culpa stricte, blameworthiness in the strict sense, § 36
Damnum, loss, § 126
damnum citra iniuriam datum, loss caused without 
injury, § 127
damnum commissionis, loss of commission, § 127
damnum culpabile, culpable loss, § 127
damnum culposum, blameworthy loss, § 127
damnum dolosum, malicious loss, § 127
damnum inculpabile, inculpable loss, § 127
damnum iniuria datum, loss caused by injury, § 127
damnum naturale, natural loss, § 130
damnum omissionis, loss of omission, § 127
damnum reparare, to restore a loss, § 128
Debitum (actio debita) externe, that which is owed externally, 
externally owed action, § 115
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debitum moraliter, that which is owed morally, § 47
Defectus rectitudinis facti vincibilis et invincibilis, 
surmountable and unsurmountable lack of rectitude of an 
act, § 34
Defendendi se suumque ius naturale, natural right to defend 
oneself and that which is one’s own, § 133
Deista, deist, § 76
Demeritum, demerit, § 28
Detrimentum, damage, § 126
Diligentia, diligence, § 38
Dolus (pro reatu sumtus seu malus), malice, malicious 
intent, § 36
Error vincibilis et invincibilis, surmountable and 
unsurmountable error, § 37
Excipere a lege, to make an exception to a law, § 25
Excludere alterum ab usu alicuius obiecti et ab usu iuris sui, to 
exclude another man from the use of some object and the use 
of one’s right, § 119
Exercere ius suum, to exercise one’s right, § 89
Exercitium iuris sui, exercise of one’s right, § 119
Existimatio, reputation, § 72
existimatio bona et mala, good and bad reputation, § 72
Externe debitum, that which is externally owed, § 115
externe indifferens, that which is externally indifferent, § 115
externe iussum, that which is externally commanded, § 115
externe obligatorium, that which is externally 
obligatory, § 115
externe permissum, that which is externally permitted, § 115
externe praeceptum, that which is externally prescribed, § 115
externe prohibitum, that which is externally prohibited, § 115
Extorsio stricte, exacting in the strict sense, § 98
Factum, act, deed, § 7
factum commissionis, act of commission, positive act, § 7
factum externe culpabile, externally culpable act, § 117
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factum externe culposum, externally malicious act, § 117
factum externe dolosum, externally blameworthy act, § 117
factum externe inculpabile, externally inculpable act, § 117
factum externe iniustum, externally wrongful act, § 117
factum externe iustum, externally rightful act, § 117
factum in genere culpabile, culpable act in general, § 35
factum in genere culposum, blameworthy act in general, § 36
factum in genere dolosum, malicious act in general, § 36
factum in genere excusabile, excusable act in general, § 35
factum in genere inculpabile, inculpable act in general, § 35
factum in genere inexcusabile, inexcusable act in 
general, § 35
factum liberum, free act, § 7
factum liberum omissionis, free act of omission, § 7, § 19n.
factum stricte, act in the strict sense, § 7
Facultas animae appetitiva, appetitive faculty of the soul, § 2
eaque inferior et superior, higher and lower appetitive faculty 
of the soul, § 3
facultas animae cognoscitiva, cognitive faculty of the 
soul, § 2
eaque inferior et superior, higher and lower cognitive faculty 
of the soul, § 3
facultas legalis, legal ability, § 114
facultas moralis, moral ability, § 44
Favor necessitatis, privilege of necessity, § 145
Felicitas hominis, happiness of man, § 24
felicitas interna et externa, internal and external 
happiness, § 24
Gens, nation, § 97
Honestas, respectability, § 72
Honestum, that which is respectable, § 72
Humanitas, humanity, § 10
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Iactura, loss, § 126
Ignorantia vincibilis et invincibilis, surmountable and 
unsurmountable ignorance, § 37
Illicitum externe, that which is externally illicit, § 114
illicitum in genere, that which is illicit in general, § 26
illicitum interne, that which is internally illicit, § 114
illicitum iure naturali stricto, that which is illicit by strict 
natural law, § 130
illicitum moraliter, that which is morally illicit, § 46
illicitum naturaliter, that which is naturally illicit, § 61
Immutabilitas obligationis naturalis, unchangeability of natural 
obligation, § 67
Impedimentum legale, legal obstacle, § 114
impedimentum morale, moral obstacle, § 45
impedimentum physicum, physical obstacle, § 44
Imperfectio hominis moralis, man’s moral imperfection, § 69
Impossibile legaliter, that which is legally impossible, § 114
impossibile moraliter, that which is morally impossible, § 44
Impossibilitas legalis, legal impossibility, § 114
impossibilitas moralis, moral impossibility, § 44
Impunitas, impunity, § 140
Imputabilitas facti, imputability of an act, § 29
Imputatio, imputation, § 28
imputatio divina, divine imputation, § 138
imputatio efficax, effective imputation, § 28
imputatio facti et iuris, imputation of act and law, § 29n.
imputatio humana, human imputation, § 138
imputatio inefficax, ineffective imputation, § 28
imputatio in foro conscientiae, impurtation in the court of 
conscience, § 138
imputatio in foro divino, imputation in the divine 
court, § 138
imputatio in foro externo, imputation in the external 
court, § 138
imputatio in foro humano, imputation in the human 
court, § 138
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imputatio in foro interno, imputation in the internal 
court, § 138
imputatio in foro poli et soli, imputation in the heavenly and 
in the earthly court, § 138
imputatio in praemium et in poenam, imputation toward a 
reward and toward a punishment, § 28
imputatio moralis, moral imputation, § 46
Imputativitas facti, imputativity of an act, § 29
imputativitas moralis, moral imputativity, § 46
Indifferens externe, externally indifferent, § 115
indifferens moraliter, morally indifferent, § 46
Indispensabilitas obligationis naturalis, indispensability of 
natural obligation, § 67n.
Infelicitas hominis, unhappiness of man, § 24
infelicitas interna et externa, internal and external 
unhappiness, § 24
Inhonestas, dishonor, § 72
Iniuria (late dicta), injury (in the broad sense), § 118
iniuria commissiva, injury of commission, § 118
iniuria culposa, blameworthy injury, § 118
iniuria dolosa, malicious injury, § 118
iniuria omissiva, injury of omission, § 118
Iniustitia (externa) personae, a person’s (external) 
injustice, § 116
Iniusta (externe) actio, (externally) wrongful action, § 116
Iniustum iure naturali stricto, that which is wrongful by strict 
natural law, § 130
Iniustus externe talis, an externally unjust man, § 116
Intellectus, intellect, § 4
Iussum externe, that which is commanded externally, § 115
iussum iure naturali stricto, that which is commanded by 
strict natural law, § 130
iussum moraliter, that which is commanded morally, § 47
Ius obiective sumtum, law, § 63
ius obiective divinum, divine law, § 63
ius obiective externum, external law, § 113, § 116
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ius obiective gentium universale late dictum, universal law 
(in the broad sense) of nations, § 97
ius obiective humanum, human law, § 63
ius obiective internum, internal law, § 113
Ius naturale cogens, peremptory natural law, § 99
ius naturale late, natural law in the broad sense, § 51
ius naturale late aeternum, eternal natural law in the broad 
sense, § 67
ius naturale late gentium, natural law (in the broad sense) of 
nations, § 97
ius naturale late immutabile, unchangeable natural law in the 
broad sense, § 67
ius naturale late indispensabile, indispensable natural law in 
the broad sense, § 67n.
ius naturale late mere tale, purely natural law in the broad 
sense, § 91
ius naturale late necessarium, inevitable natural law in the 
broad sense, § 67
ius naturale late oeconomicum, natural household law in the 
broad sense, § 95
ius naturale late societatis universalis, natural law (in the 
broad sense) of universal society, § 83
ius naturale late societatum domesticarum, natural law (in 
the broad sense) of domestic societies, § 95
ius naturale late societatum particularium, natural law (in 
the broad sense) of particular societies, § 91
ius naturale late universale, universal natural law in the 
broad sense, § 97
ius naturale stricte, natural law in the strict sense, § 99
Ius perfectum, perfect right, § 100
Ius philosophicum, philosophical law, § 63
Ius positivum, positive law, § 65
ius positivum idque divinum et humanum, positive law 
divine and human, § 65
ius rationis, law of reason, § 64
ius revelationis, law of revelation, § 64
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ius sociale universale late dictum, universal social law in the 
broad sense, § 91
ius societatis universalis, law of universal society, § 83
ius societatum domesticarum naturale late dictum, natural 
law (in the broad sense) of domestic societies, § 95
Ius universale late dictum gentium, universal law (in the broad 
sense) of nations, § 97
ius universale oeconomicum, universal household law, § 95
ius universale sociale, universal social law, § 91
ius universale societatum domesticarum, universal law of 
domestic societies, § 95
ius universale societatum particularium, universal law of 
particular societies, § 91
Ius subiective pro facultate morali sumtum, right in the sense of 
moral ability, § 44
ius subiective pro facultate personae, right in the sense of a 
person’s ability, § 114
ius subiective pro facultate physica, right in the sense of 
physical ability, § 63
ius subiective idque naturale et positivum, right, natural and 
positive, § 65
Ius alienum, another’s right, § 120
Ius alterius turbare, to disturb another’s right, § 120
Ius externum, external right, § 114
Ius internum, internal right, § 114
Ius meum, my (proper/own) right, § 119, § 124
Ius merae facultatis, purely facultative right, § 115
Ius morale, moral right, § 44
Ius naturale ad periculum propulsandum, natural right to avert 
danger, § 134
ius naturale late dictum, natural right in the broad sense, § 87
ius naturale resistendi laedere conanti, natural right to resist 
one who tries to wrong us, § 133
ius naturale securitatis, natural right of security, § 134
ius naturale sese suumque defendendi, natural right to 
defend oneself and that which is one’s own, § 133
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ius naturale stricte dictum seu strictum, natural right taken 
in the strict sense or strict natural right, § 100, § 108
Ius proprium late, own (proper) right in the broad sense, § 122
ius proprium stricte, own (proper) right in the strict 
sense, § 125
Ius suum, one’s (proper/own) right, § 119, § 124
ius suum alteri auferre, to remove another’s proper 
right, § 120
ius suum alteri tribuere, to grant another’s proper right, § 120
Iusta (externe) actio, (externally) rightful action, § 116
Iustitia externa et interna personae, person’s external and 
internal justice, § 116
Iustum externe tale, that which is externally rightful, § 116
Iustus externe talis, externally just, § 116
Laesio, wrong, § 118
laesio commissiva, wrong of commission, § 118
laesio culpabilis, culpable wrong, § 118
laesio culposa, blameworthy wrong, § 118
laesio dolosa, malicious wrong, § 118
laesio imminens, imminent wrong, § 133
laesio inculpabilis, inculpable wrong, § 118
laesio naturalis, natural wrong, § 130
laesio omissiva, wrong of omission, § 118
Laesionem intentans, one who threatens a wrong, § 134
Latitudo moralis, moral latitude, § 57
Legem servare, to observe a law, § 25
Legi satisfacere, to satisfy a law, § 25
Legis iuridicae auctoritas, authority of a juridical law, § 74
Legislator, legislator, § 63
Legis promulgatio, promulgation of a law, § 66
Legis publicatio, publication of a law, § 66
Legis transgressio late, transgression of a law in the broad 
sense, § 34
legis transgressio stricte, transgression of a law in the strict 
sense, § 35
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legis transgressio culpabilis et inculpabilis, culpable and 
inculpable transgression of a law, § 35
legis transgressio culposa et dolosa, blameworthy and 
malicious transgression of a law, § 36
legis transgressio excusabilis et inexcusabilis, excusable and 
inexcusable transgression of a law, § 35
Legis violatio late, violation of a law in the broad sense, § 34
legis violatio stricte, violation of a law in the strict sense, § 35
Legis vis obligandi et imputandi, a law’s force to obligate and to 
impute, § 42
Legum collisio, collision of laws, § 25
Lex, law, § 13
lex aiens, stating law, § 19
lex cedens legi alteri, law ceding to another law, § 25
lex cogens, peremptory law, § 99
lex divina, divine law, § 43
lex divina positiva, positive divine law, § 50
lex externa, external law, § 113, § 116
lex imperfecta, imperfect law, § 99
lex interna, internal law, § 113
lex iubens, commanding law, § 90
lex iuridice talis, juridical law, § 63
lex moralis late, moral law in the broad sense, § 13
lex moralis stricte, moral law in the strict sense, § 43
lex naturalis cogens, peremptory natural law, § 99
lex naturalis imperfecta, imperfect natural law, § 99
lex naturalis late, natural law in the broad sense, § 49, § 50
Lex naturalis stricte, natural law in the strict sense, § 99
lex naturalis aeterna, eternal natural law, § 67
lex naturalis immutabilis, unchangeable natural law, § 67
lex naturalis indispensabilis, indispensable natural law, § 67n.
lex naturalis necessaria, inevitable natural law, § 67
lex naturalis universalis, universal natural law, § 67
Lex negans, denying law, § 19
Lex perfecta, perfect law, § 99
lex perfectiva, perfective law, § 25
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Lex permittens, permitting law, § 90
Lex positiva, positive law, § 65
lex positiva eaque divina et humana, positive law divine and 
human, § 65
lex praeceptiva, prescriptive law, § 19
lex prohibitiva, prohibitive law, § 19
lex rationis, law of reason, § 64
lex revelationis, law of revelation, § 64
lex vetans, prohibiting law, § 19
lex vincens legem aliam, law defeating another law, § 25
Libertas interna, internal liberty, § 6
Libertas mentis, liberty of the mind, § 6
Licitum externe, that which is externally licit, § 114
licitum in genere, that which is licit in general, § 26
licitum interne, that which is internally licit, § 114
licitum iure naturali stricto, that which is licit by strict 
natural law, § 130
licitum moraliter, that which is morally licit, § 46
licitum naturaliter, that which is naturally licit, § 61
Limitatio essentialis, essential limitation, § 57
Lubitus, discretion, § 6
Maleficium, misdeed, § 117
Maleficus, malfeasant, § 117
Malum morale, morally bad thing, § 46, § 68
malum physicum, physically bad thing, § 68
malum idque positivum et privativum, bad thing positive 
and negative, § 68
Mereri aliquid, to deserve something, § 27
Meritum late, reward in the broad sense, § 27
meritum stricte, reward in the strict sense, § 27
Meum, that which is my own, § 119, § 124
Miseria, misery, § 24
Morale corpus, moral body, § 92
morale impedimentum, moral obstacle, § 45
morale ius, moral law, § 44
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morale officium, moral duty, § 47
morale vitium, moral vice, § 47
Moralis actio, moral action, § 47
moralis conscientia, moral conscience, § 70
moralis eaque bona et mala, moral conscience good and 
bad, § 70
moralis facultas, moral ability, § 44
moralis imperfectio, moral imperfection, § 69
moralis impossibilitas (stricte), moral impossibility (in the 
strict sense), § 44
moralis imputatio, moral imputation § 46
moralis imputativitas, moral imputability, § 46
moralis lex late, moral law in the broad sense, § 13
moralis lex stricte, moral law in the strict sense, § 43
moralis necessitas late, moral necessity in the broad 
sense, § 11
moralis necessitas stricte, moral necessity in the strict 
sense, § 44
moralis obligatio, moral obligation, § 43
moralis perfectio, moral perfection, § 69
moralis persona, moral person, § 92
moralis philosophia, moral philosophy, § 51
moralis possibilitas (stricte), moral possibility (in the strict 
sense), § 44
moralis reatus, moral guilt, § 46, § 47
moralis virtus, moral virtue, § 47
moralis vitiositas, moral depravity, § 47
Moralitas actionis, morality of action, § 47
Moraliter bonum, that which is morally good, § 46
moraliter debitum, that which is morally owed, § 47
moraliter illicitum, that which is morally illicit, § 46
moraliter impossibile (stricte), that which is morally 
impossible (in the strict sense), § 44
moraliter indifferens, that which is morally indifferent, § 46
moraliter iussum, that which is morally commanded, § 47
moraliter licitum, that which is morally licit, § 46
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moraliter malum, that which is morally bad, § 46
moraliter necessarium (stricte), that which is morally 
necessary (in the strict sense), § 44
moraliter obligatorium, that which is morally obligatory, § 46
moraliter possibile (stricte), that which is morally possible 
(in the strict sense), § 44
moraliter praeceptum, that which is morally prescribed, § 46
moraliter prohibitum, that which is morally prohibited, § 46
Motivum, motive, § 11
Natura, nature, § 10
natura hominis, man’s nature, § 10
Naturae humanae prima, first things of human nature, § 10
Naturale, that which is natural, § 10
Necessarium legaliter, that which is legally necessary, § 114
necessarium moraliter (stricte), that which is morally 
necessary (in the strict sense), § 44
Necessitas extrema, extreme necessity, § 143
necessitas ineluctabilis, ultimate need, § 143
necessitas legalis, legal necessity, § 114
necessitas moralis late, moral necessity in the broad 
sense, § 11
necessitas moralis stricte, moral necessity in the strict 
sense, § 44
necessitas obligationis naturalis, inevitability of natural 
obligation, § 67
necessitas ultima, ultimate need, § 143
Necessitatis casus, case of need, § 143
Necessitatis favor, privilege of necessity, § 145
Neglectio legis et obligationis, exception to a law and 
obligation, § 25
Negligentia, negligence, § 38
Noluntas, unwillingness, § 4
Non-factum, non-act, § 7, § 19n.
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Obligatio (in generali), obligation (in general), § 12n.
Obligatio (passiva), (passive) obligation, § 12
obligatio activa, active obligation, § 12n.
Obligatio ad reparandum damnum, obligation to restore a 
loss, § 128
obligatio affirmativa, affirmative obligation, § 19
obligatio conscientiae, obligation of conscience, § 43
obligatio externa, external obligation, § 112
obligatio in foro divino, obligation in the divine court, § 112
obligatio in foro externo, obligation in the external 
court, § 122
obligatio in foro humano, obligation in the human 
court, § 112
obligatio in foro interno, obligation in the internal 
court, § 112
obligatio interna, internal obligation, § 112
obligatio iuridica, juridical obligation, § 63
obligatio iuridica naturalis et positiva, natural and positive 
juridical obligation, § 65
obligatio moralis, moral obligation, § 43
obligatio moralis positiva, positive moral obligation, § 49
obligatio naturalis, natural obligation, § 49
obligatio naturalis aeterna, eternal natural obligation, § 49
obligatio naturalis immutabilis, unchangeable natural 
obligation, § 67
obligatio naturalis imperfecta, imperfect natural 
obligation, § 98
obligatio naturalis indispensabilis, indispensable natural 
obligation, § 67n.
obligatio naturalis necessaria, necessary natural 
obligation, § 98, § 100
obligatio naturalis universalis, universal natural 
obligation, § 67
obligatio negativa, negative obligation, § 19
obligatio perfecta, perfect obligation, § 98, § 100
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Obligationis violatio late, violation of obligation in the broad 
sense, § 34
obligationis violatio stricte, violation of obligation in the 
strict sense, § 35
obligationis violatio culpabilis et inculpabilis, culpable and 
inculpable violation of obligation, § 35
obligationis violatio culposa et dolosa, blameworthy and 
malicious violation of obligation, § 36
obligationis violatio excusabilis et inexcusabilis, excusable 
and inexcusable violation of obligation § 35
Obligationi satisfacere, to satisfy an obligation, § 25
Obligationum collisio, conflict of obligations, § 25
Obligatorium externe, that which is externally obligatory, § 115
obligatorium iure naturali stricto, that which is obligatory by 
strict natural law, § 130
obligatorium moraliter, that which is morally obligatory, § 46
obligatorium naturaliter, that which is naturally 
obligatory, § 61
Occasio agendi, occasion to act, § 19
Oeconomicum ius universale late dictum, universal household 
law in the broad sense, § 95
Officia amoris, duties of love, § 106
officia benevolentiae, duties of benevolence, § 106
officia charitatis, duties of charity, § 106
officia humanitatis, duties of humanity, § 106
officia necessitatis, duties of necessity, § 106
officia socialitatis, duties of sociality, § 83
Officium in genere (iuris, iuridice tale), duty in general (duty of 
law, juridical duty), § 63
officium idque vel naturale vel positivum, duty either natural 
or positive, § 65
Officium externum, external duty, § 113
officium imperfectum, imperfect duty, § 106
officium internum, internal duty, § 113
officium morale, moral duty, § 47
officium naturale, natural duty, § 61
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officium perfectum, perfect duty, § 106
officium positivum, positive duty, § 65
Peccatum, sin, § 47
peccatum naturale, natural sin, § 61
Perfectio hominis moralis, moral perfection of man, § 69
Periculum, danger, § 134
periculum extremum, extreme danger, § 143
Permissum externe, that which is permitted externally, § 115
permissum interne, that which is permitted internally, § 115
permissum iure naturali stricto, that which is permitted by 
strict natural law, § 130
permissum moraliter, that which is permitted morally, § 46
permissum naturaliter, that which is permitted naturally, § 61
Persona, person, § 6
persona moralis, moral person, § 92
persona mystica, mystical person, § 92
Philosophia moralis, moral philosophy, § 51
Poena, punishment, § 27
poena iuridice talis, punishment in the juridical sense, § 63
poena naturalis, natural punishment, § 65
poena positiva, positive punishment, § 65
Poenae divinae, divine punishments, § 68
poenae divinae eaeque naturales et arbitrariae, divine 
punishments natural and arbitrary, § 68
Possibile legaliter, that which is legally possible, § 114
possibile moraliter, that which is morally possible, § 44
Possibilitas legalis, legal possibility, § 114
possibilitas moralis, moral possibility, § 44
Potestate in alicuius positum, that which is in one’s power, § 8
Prima naturae humanae, first things of human nature, § 10
Principium cognoscendi complexum obligationis in genere, 
complex principle of knowledge of obligation in general, § 23
Principium cognoscendi iuris naturalis late dicti complexum, 
complex principle of knowledge of natural law in the broad 
sense, § 58
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principium cognoscendi iuris naturalis late dicti 
incomplexum, incomplex principle of knowledge of 
natural law in the broad sense, § 59
Principium fiendi iuris naturalis late dicti, principle of existence 
of natural law in the broad sense, § 58
Principium fiendi obligationis in genere, principle of existence 
of obligation in general, § 23
Praeceptum externe, that which is prescribed externally, § 115
praeceptum interne, that which is prescribed internally, § 115
praeceptum iure naturali stricto, that which is prescribed by 
strict natural law, § 130
praeceptum moraliter, that which is prescribed morally, § 46
Prohibitum naturaliter, that which is prohibited naturally, § 61
Promulgatio legis, promulgation of a law, § 66
Proprietas late, proprietorship in the broad sense, § 122
proprietas stricte, proprietorship in the strict sense, § 125
Proprium late, that which is owned in the broad sense, § 122
proprium stricte, that which is owned in the strict 
sense, § 125
Prosperitas hominis, man’s prosperity, § 24
Publicatio legis, publication of a law, § 66
Pugna legum, conflict of laws, § 25
Punctum morale, moral point, § 57
Ratio, qua facultas animae, reason in the sense of a faculty of the 
soul, § 4
Reatus, guilt, § 35
reatus culposus et dolosus, blameworthy and malicious 
guilt, § 36
reatus moralis, moral guilt, § 46, § 47
Reparatio damni, restoration of loss, § 128
Resistendi ius naturale, natural right to resist, § 133
Res merae voluntatis, purely voluntary matter, § 115
Restrictio tacita, tacit restriction, § 57
Revelatio in genere, revelation in general, § 64n.
revelatio specialis, special revelation, § 64n.
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Reus culposus et dolosus, blameworthy and malicious 
agent, § 36
Salus societatis, society’s welfare, § 85
Securitas, security, § 134
Socialitas, sociality, § 83
Societas, society, § 82
societas composita, composite society, § 94
societas simplex, simple society, § 94
societas universalis late, universal society in the broad 
sense, § 82
societas universalis stricte, universal society in the strict 
sense, § 83
Societates domesticae, domestic societies, § 95
Societatis salus, society’s welfare, § 85
Societatum domesticarum ius universale late dictum, universal 
law (in the broad sense) of domestic societies, § 95
Societatum particularium ius universale late dictum, universal 
law (in the broad sense) of particular societies, § 95
Socius, associate, § 82
Spiritus, spirit, § 6
Spontaneitas, spontaneity, § 6
Status hominis extraordinarius, extraordinary state of 
man, § 143
status extrasocialis, extrasocial state, § 91
status irregularis, irregular state, § 141
status naturalis, natural state, § 91
status ordinarius, ordinary state, § 143
status regularis, regular state, § 143
status socialis, social state, § 91
Stimulus, stimulus, § 11
Superior, superior, § 63
Suum, that which is one’s own, § 119, § 124
Suum alteri non tribuere, not giving the other man his 
own, § 120
Suum naturale, that which is one’s natural own, § 130
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Theologia positiva moralis, moral positive theology, § 51
Transgressio legis et obligationis, transgression of a law and 
obligation, § 34
transgressio culpabilis, culpable transgression, § 35
transgressio culposa, blameworthy transgression, § 36
transgressio dolosa, malicious transgression, § 36
transgressio excusabilis, excusable transgression, § 35
transgressio inculpabilis, inculpable transgression, § 35
transgressio inculpata, inculpable transgression, § 35
transgressio inexcusabilis, inexcusable transgression, § 35
transgressio late, transgression in the broad sense, § 34
transgressio stricte, transgression in the strict sense, § 35
Turpe, that which is dishonorable, § 72
Turpitudo, shamefulness, § 72
Tuum, that which is yours, your own, § 119
Universalitas obligationis naturalis, universality of natural 
obligation, § 67
Usus iuris sui, use of one’s right, § 119
Uti, to use, § 119
Uti iure suo, to use one’s right, § 89, § 119
Utile, that which is useful, § 85
Utilitas, usefulness, § 85
Violatio legis et obligationis, see transgressio legis
Violentia late, violence in the broad sense, § 135
violentia stricte, violence in the strict sense, § 98
Virtus (moralis), (moral) virtue, § 47
virtus naturalis, natural virtue, § 61
Vis externa late, external force in the broad sense, § 135
vis externa stricte, external force in the strict sense, § 98
Vis obligandi et imputandi legis, a law’s force to obligate and to 
impute, § 42
Vitiositas, depravity, § 47
Vitium, vice, § 47
Voluntas, will, § 4

139
Index of Subjects, English-Latin
This is a slightly shortened version of Achenwall’s original Latin 
index together with the English translation. Thus, this index 
doubles as a glossary.
References are to the paragraph numbers. Mistakes in the original 
index have been tacitly corrected.
Ability, legal, facultas legalis, § 114
moral ability, facultas moralis, § 44
Abuse of one’s faculties, abusus facultatum suarum, § 38
Act, factum, § 7
act in the strict sense, factum stricte, § 7
act of commission, positive act, actio commissiva, factum 
commissionis, § 7
act of omission, actio omissiva, actio privativa, § 7, § 19n. 
act of pure choice, actus meri arbitrii, § 115
blameworthy act in general, factum in genere culposum, § 36
culpable act in general, factum in genere culpabile, § 35
excusable act in general, factum in genere excusabile, § 35
externally blameworthy act, factum externe dolosum, § 11
externally commanded act, actio externe iussa, § 115
externally culpable act, factum externe culpabile, § 117
externally inculpable act, factum externe inculpabile, § 117
externally malicious act, factum externe culposum, § 117
externally obligatory act, actio externe obligatoria, § 115
externally owed act, actio externe debita, § 115
externally permitted act, actio externe permissa, § 115
externally prescribed act, actio externe praecepta, § 115
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externally prohibited act, actio externe prohibita, § 115
externally rightful act, factum externe iustum, § 117
externally wrongful act, factum externe iniustum, § 117
free act, factum liberum, § 7
free act of omission, factum liberum omissionis, § 7, § 19n.
free positive act and act of omission, actio libera commissiva 
et omissiva, § 7, § 19n.
inculpable act in general, factum in genere inculpabile, § 35
inexcusable act in general, factum in genere inexcusabile, § 35
malicious act in general, factum in genere dolosum, § 36
negative act, actio negativa, § 
positive act, actio positiva, § 7
Action against one’s will, actio invita, § 40
action from ignorance, actio ex ignorantia, § 37
action that is not right, actio minus recta, § 26
commanded action, actio iussa, § 63
dishonorable action, actio inhonesta, § 72
evil action, actio prava, § 46
explicitly, implicitly and tacitly permitted action, actio 
permissa explicite, implicite et tacite, § 63
external action, actio externa, § 1
(externally) rightful action, actio iusta (externe), § 116
(externally) wrongful action, actio iniusta (externe), § 116
free action, actio libera, § 7
free action as regards determination and as regards 
execution, actio libera ratione determinationis et 
exsecutionis, § 8n.
human action, actio humana, § 7
illicit action, actio illicita, § 26
indifferent action, actio indifferens, § 26
internal action, actio interna, § 1
licit action, actio licita, § 7 
moral action, actio moralis, § 4
morally bad action, actio moraliter mala, § 47
morally blameworthy action, actio moraliter culposa, § 46
morally correct action, actio moraliter recta, § 46
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morally culpable action, actio moraliter culpabilis, § 46
morally dishonorable action, actio moraliter turpis, § 72
morally evil action, actio moraliter prava, § 4
morally good action, actio moraliter bona, § 4
morally illicit action, actio moraliter illicita, § 46
morally imputable action, actio moraliter imputabilis, § 46
morally incorrect action, actio moraliter minus recta, § 46
morally inculpable action, actio moraliter inculpabilis, § 46
morally indifferent action, actio moraliter indifferens, § 46
morally licit action, actio moraliter licita, § 46
morally malicious action, actio moraliter dolosa, § 46
morally owed action, actio moraliter debita, § 46
morally necessary action in the broad sense, actio moraliter 
necessaria late, § 11
morally necessary action in the strict sense, actio moraliter 
necessaria stricte, § 44
morally obligatory action, actio moraliter obligatoria, § 46
morally prescribed action, actio moraliter praecepta, § 46
morally prohibited action, actio moraliter prohibita, § 46
obligatory action, actio obligatoria, § 26
owed action, actio debita, § 26
permitted action, actio permissa, § 63
physically necessary action, actio physice necessaria, § 8
prescribed and prohibited obligatory action, actio obligatoria 
praecepta et prohibita, § 26
purely natural action, actio mere naturalis, § 14
respectable action, actio honesta, § 72
right action, actio recta, § 26
Agent, blameworthy and malicious, reus culposus et 
dolosus, § 36
Appetitive faculty of the soul, see faculty
Associate, socius, § 82
Association, consociatio, § 82
Atheist, atheus, § 76
Author, auctor, § 27
Authority of a juridical law, auctoritas legis iuridicae, § 74
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Bad thing, positive and negative, malum idque positivum et 
privativum, § 68
morally bad thing, malum morale, § 46, § 68
physically bad thing, malum physicum, § 68
Beatitude, beatitudo, § 24
Blameworthiness in the broad sense, culpa late, § 35
blameworthiness in the strict sense, culpa stricte, § 36
Body, moral, corpus morale, § 92
mystical body, corpus mysticum, § 92
Case of need, casus necessitatis, § 143
Cause, free, caussa libera, § 27
impulsive cause, caussa impulsiva, § 11
Choice, arbitrium, § 6
free choice, arbitrium liberum, § 6
Co-cause of an act, concaussa facti, § 31
Coercion in the broad sense, coactio late, § 135
coercion in the strict sense, coactio et cogere stricte, § 98
Cognitive faculty of the soul, see faculty
Collision of laws, see conflict of laws
Commanded by strict natural law, that which is, iussum iure 
naturali stricto, § 130
that which is commanded externally, iussum externe, § 115
that which is commanded morally, iussum moraliter, § 47
Common, that which is, commune, § 125
Communion of a right, communio iuris, § 125
Conflict of laws, collision of laws, pugna legum, antinomia, 
collisio legum, § 25
Conscience, moral, conscientia moralis, § 70
good and bad moral conscience, conscientia moralis bona et 
mala, § 70
obligation of conscience, obligatio conscientiae, § 43
Contribute to an act, concurrere ad factum, § 31
Damage, detrimentum, § 126
Danger, periculum, § 134
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extreme danger, periculum extremum, § 143
Deed, see act
Defend oneself and that which is one’s own, natural right to, ius 
naturale defendendi se suumque, § 133
Deist, deista, § 76
Demerit, demeritum, § 28
Deserve something, mereri aliquid, § 27
Diligence, diligentia, § 38
Discretion, lubitus, § 6
Dishonor, inhonestas, § 72
Depravity, vitiositas, § 47
Dishonorable, that which is, turpe, § 72 
Duties of benevolence, officia benevolentiae, § 106
duties of charity, officia charitatis, § 106
duties of humanity, officia humanitatis, § 106
duties of love, officia amoris, § 106
duties of necessity, officia necessitatis, § 106
duties of sociality, officia socialitatis, § 83
Duty in general (duty of law, juridical duty), officium in genere 
(iuris, iuridice tale), § 63
duty either natural or positive, officium idque vel naturale vel 
positivum, § 65
external duty, officium externum, § 113
imperfect duty, officium imperfectum, § 106
internal duty, officium internum, § 113
moral duty, officium morale, § 47
natural duty, officium naturale, § 61
perfect duty, officium perfectum, § 106
positive duty, officium positivum, § 65
Error, surmountable and unsurmountable, error vincibilis et 
invincibilis, § 37
Eternity of natural obligation, aeternitas obligationis 
naturalis, § 67
Exacting in the strict sense, extorsio stricte, § 98
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Exception to a law and obligation, neglectio legis et 
obligationis, § 25
make an exception to a law, excipere a lege, § 25
Exclude another man from the use of some object and the use of 
one’s right, excludere alterum ab usu alicuius obiecti et ab usu 
iuris sui, § 119
Exercise of one’s right, exercitium iuris sui, § 119
exercise one’s right, exercere ius suum, § 89
Externally commanded, that which is, externe iussum, § 115
that which is externally indifferent, externe indifferens, § 115
that which is externally owed, externe debitum, § 115
that which is externally obligatory, externe 
obligatorium, § 115
that which is externally permitted, externe permissum, § 115
that which is externally prescribed, externe praeceptum, § 115
that which is externally prohibited, externe prohibitum, § 115
Faculty of the human soul, appetitive, facultas appetitiva animae 
humanae, § 2
cognitive faculty of the human soul, facultas cognoscitiva 
animae humanae, § 2
higher and lower appetitive faculty of the human soul, 
facultas appetitiva animae humanae inferior et 
superior, § 3
higher and lower cognitive faculty of the human soul, 
facultas cognoscitiva animae humanae inferior et 
superior, § 3
Force in the broad sense, external, vis externa late, § 135
external force in the strict sense, vis externa stricte, § 98
force of a law to obligate and to impute, vis obligandi et 
imputandi legis, § 42
Good thing, moral, i.e., that which is morally good, bonum 
morale seu moraliter bonum, § 46, § 68
physical good thing, bonum physicum, § 68
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positive and negative physical good, bonum physicum 
positivum et privativum, § 68
Guilt, reatus, § 35
blameworthy and malicious guilt, reatus culposus et 
dolosus, § 36
moral guilt, reatus moralis, § 46, § 47
Happiness of man, felicitas hominis, § 24
internal and external happiness, felicitas interna et 
externa, § 24
Human nature, first things of, prima naturae humanae, § 10
Human soul, see soul
Humanity, humanitas, § 10
Ignorance, surmountable and unsurmountable, ignorantia 
vincibilis et invincibilis, § 37
Illicit in general, that which is, illicitum in genere, § 26
that which is externally illicit, illicitum externe, § 114
that which is illicit by strict natural law, illicitum iure naturali 
stricto, § 130
that which is internally illicit, illicitum interne, § 114
that which is morally illicit, illicitum moraliter, § 46
that which is naturally illicit, illicitum naturaliter, § 61
Imperfection, man’s moral, imperfectio hominis moralis, § 69
Impossible, that which is legally, impossibile legaliter, § 114
that which is morally impossible, impossibile moraliter, § 44
Impossibility, legal, impossibilitas legalis, § 114
moral impossibility, impossibilitas moralis, § 44
Impunity, impunitas, § 140
Imputability of an act, imputabilitas facti, § 29
Imputation, imputatio, § 28
divine imputation, imputatio divina, § 138
effective imputation, imputatio efficax, § 28
human imputation, imputatio humana, § 138
imputation of act and law, imputatio facti et iuris, § 29n.
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imputation in the court of conscience, imputatio in foro 
conscientiae, § 138
imputation in the divine court, imputatio in foro 
divino, § 138
imputation in the external court, imputatio in foro 
externo, § 138
imputation in the heavenly and in the earthly court, 
imputatio in foro poli et soli, § 138
imputation in the human court, imputatio in foro 
humano, § 138
imputation in the internal court, imputatio in foro 
interno, § 138
imputation toward a reward and toward a punishment, 
imputatio in praemium et in poenam, § 28
ineffective imputation, imputatio inefficax, § 28
moral imputation, imputatio moralis, § 46
Imputativity of an act, imputativitas facti, § 29
moral imputativity, imputativitas moralis, § 46
Indifferent, externally, indifferens externe, § 115
morally indifferent, indifferens moraliter, § 46
Indispensability of natural obligation, indispensabilitas 
obligationis naturalis, § 67n.
Injury (in the broadsense), iniuria (late dicta), § 118
blameworthy injury, iniuria culposa, § 118
injury of commission, iniuria commissiva, § 118
injury of omission, iniuria omissiva, § 118
malicious injury, iniuria dolosa, § 118
Injustice, person’s (external), iniustitia (externa) 
personae, § 116
Intellect, intellectus, § 4
Just, externally, iustus externe talis, § 116
Justice, person’s external and internal, iustitia externa et interna 
personae, § 116
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Lack of rectitude of an act, surmountable and unsurmountable, 
defectus rectitudinis facti vincibilis et invincibilis, § 34
Latitude, moral, latitudo moralis, § 57
Law, ius obiective sumtum, § 63, lex, § 13
a law’s force to obligate and to impute, vis legis obligandi et 
imputandi, § 42
authority of a juridical law, auctoritas legis iuridicae, § 74
commanding law, lex iubens, § 90
denying law, lex negans, § 19
divine law, ius obiective divinum, § 63, lex divina, § 43
eternal natural law, lex naturalis aeterna, § 67
external law, ius obiective externum, § 113, § 116, lex 
externa, § 113, § 116
human law, ius obiective humanum, § 63
imperfect law, lex imperfecta, § 99
imperfect natural law, lex naturalis imperfecta, § 99
indispensable natural law, lex naturalis indispensabilis, § 67n.
inevitable natural law, lex naturalis necessaria, § 67
internal law, ius obiective internum, lex interna, § 113
juridical law, lex iuridice talis, § 63
law ceding to another law, lex cedens legi alteri, § 25
law defeating another law, lex vincens legem aliam, § 25
law of reason, ius rationis, lex rationis, § 64
law of revelation, ius revelationis, lex revelationis, § 64
law of universal society, ius societatis universalis, § 83
moral law in the broad sense, lex moralis late, § 13
moral law in the strict sense, lex moralis stricte, § 43
natural law, ius obiective naturale, see natural
natural law in the broad sense, lex naturalis late, § 49, § 50
natural law in the strict sense, lex naturalis stricte, § 99
observe a law, legem servare, § 25
peremptory law, lex cogens, § 99
peremptory natural law, lex naturalis cogens, § 99
perfect law, lex perfecta, § 99
perfective law, lex perfectiva, § 25
permitting law, lex permittens, § 90
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philosophical law, ius philosophicum, § 63
positive divine law, lex divina positiva, § 50
positive law, ius positivum, lex positiva, § 65
positive law divine and human, ius positivum idque divinum 
et humanum, lex positiva eaque divina et humana, § 65
prescriptive law, lex praeceptiva, § 19
prohibiting law, lex vetans, § 19
prohibitive law, lex prohibitiva, § 19
promulgation of a law, promulgatio legis, § 66
publication of a law, publicatio legis, § 66
satisfy a law, legi satisfacere, § 25
stating law, lex aiens, § 19
transgression of a law in the broad sense, transgressio legis 
late, § 34
transgression of a law in the strict sense, transgressio legis 
stricte, § 35
culpable and inculpable transgression of a law, transgressio 
legis culpabilis et inculpabilis, § 35
blameworthy and malicious transgression of a law, 
transgressio legis culposa et dolosa, § 36
excusable and inexcusable transgression of a law, transgressio 
legis excusabilis et inexcusabilis, § 35
unchangeable natural law, lex naturalis immutabilis, § 67
universal natural law, lex naturalis universalis, § 67
universal law (in the broad sense) of nations, ius obiective 
gentium universale late dictum, § 97
  universal law (in the broad sense) of particular societies, ius 
universale late dictum societatum particularium, § 95
violation of a law in the broad sense, violatio legis late, § 34
violation of a law in the strict sense, violatio legis stricte, § 35
Legislator, legislator, § 63
Liberty of the mind, libertas mentis, § 6
internal liberty, libertas interna, § 6
Licit in general, that which is, licitum in genere, § 26
that which is externally licit, licitum externe, § 114
that which is internally licit, licitum interne, § 114
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that which is licit by strict natural law, licitum iure naturali 
stricto, § 130
that which is morally licit, licitum moraliter, § 46
that which is naturally licit, licitum naturaliter, § 61
Limitation, essential, limitatio essentialis, § 57
Loss, damnum, iactura, § 126
blameworthy loss, damnum culposum, § 12
culpable loss, damnum culpabile, § 127
inculpable loss, damnum inculpabile, § 127
loss caused by injury, damnum iniuria datum, § 12
loss caused without injury, damnum citra iniuriam 
datum, § 12
loss of commission, damnum commissionis, § 12
loss of omission, damnum omissionis, § 12
malicious loss, damnum dolosum, § 127
natural loss, damnum naturale, § 130
restore a loss, damnum reparare, § 128
Malfeasant, maleficus, § 117
Malice, malicious intent, dolus (pro reatu sumtus seu 
malus), § 36
Matter, purely voluntary, res merae voluntatis, § 115
Misdeed, maleficium, § 117
Misery, miseria, § 24
Moral ability, facultas moralis, § 44
moral action, actio moralis, § 47
moral body, corpus morale, § 92
moral conscience, good and bad, conscientia moralis eaque 
bona et mala, § 70
moral depravity, vitiositas moralis, § 47
moral duty, officium morale, § 47
moral guilt, reatus moralis, § 46, § 47
moral imperfection, imperfectio moralis, § 69
moral impossibility (in the strict sense), impossibilitas 
moralis (stricte), § 44
moral imputability, imputativitas moralis, § 46
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moral imputation, imputatio moralis, § 46
moral law, ius morale, § 44
moral law in the broad sense, lex moralis late, § 13
moral law in the strict sense, lex moralis stricte, § 43
moral necessity in the broad sense, necessitas moralis 
late, § 11
moral necessity in the strict sense, necessitas moralis 
stricte, § 44
moral obligation, obligatio moralis, § 43
moral obstacle, impedimentum morale, § 45
moral perfection, perfectio moralis, § 69
moral person, persona moralis, § 92
moral philosophy, philosophia moralis, § 51
moral possibility (in the strict sense), possibilitas moralis 
(stricte), § 44
moral vice, vitium morale, § 47
moral virtue, virtus moralis, § 47
Morality of action, moralitas actionis, § 47
Morally bad, that which is, moraliter malum, § 46
that which is morally commanded, moraliter iussum, § 47
that which is morally good, moraliter bonum, § 46
that which is morally illicit, moraliter illicitum, § 46
that which is morally impossible (in the strict sense), 
moraliter impossibile (stricte), § 44
that which is morally indifferent, moraliter indifferens, § 46
that which is morally licit, moraliter licitum, § 46
that which is morally necessary (in the strict sense), 
moraliter necessarium (stricte), § 44
that which is morally obligatory, moraliter obligatorium, § 46
that which is morally owed, moraliter debitum, § 47
that which is morally possible (in the strict sense), moraliter 
possibile (stricte), § 44
that which is morally prescribed, moraliter praeceptum, § 46
that which is morally prohibited, moraliter prohibitum, § 46
Motive, motivum, § 11
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Nation, gens, § 97
Natural, that which is, naturale, § 10
Natural law in the broad sense, ius naturale late, § 51
eternal natural law in the broad sense, ius naturale late 
aeternum, § 67
indispensable natural law in the broad sense, ius naturale late 
indispensabile, § 67n.
inevitable natural law in the broad sense, ius naturale late 
necessarium, § 67
natural household law in the broad sense, ius naturale late 
oeconomicum, § 95
natural law (in the broad sense) of domestic societies, ius 
societatum domesticarum naturale late dictum, § 95
natural law (in the broad sense) of nations, ius naturale late 
gentium, § 97
natural law (in the broad sense) of particular societies, ius 
naturale late societatum particularium, § 91
natural law (in the broad sense) of universal society, ius 
naturale late societatis universalis, § 83
natural law in the strict sense, ius naturale stricte, § 99
peremptory natural law, ius naturale cogens, § 99
purely natural law in the broad sense, ius naturale late mere 
tale, § 91
unchangeable natural law in the broad sense, ius naturale late 
immutabile, § 67
universal natural law in the broad sense, ius naturale late 
universale, § 9
Nature, natura, § 10
first things of human nature, naturae humanae prima, § 10
man’s nature, natura hominis, § 10
Necessary, that which is legally, necessarium legaliter, § 114
that which is morally necessary (in the strict sense), 
necessarium moraliter (stricte), § 44
Necessity, extreme, necessitas extrema, § 143
legal necessity, necessitas legalis, § 114
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moral necessity in the broad sense, necessitas moralis 
late, § 11
morally necessity in the strict sense, necessitas moralis 
stricte, § 44
inevitability of natural obligation, necessitas obligationis 
naturalis, § 67
privilege of necessity, favor necessitatis, § 145
ultimate need, necessitas ineluctabilis, necessitas ultima, § 143
Need, case of, casus necessitatis, § 143
Negligence, negligentia, § 38
Non-act, non-factum, § 7, § 19n.
Obligation (in general), obligatio (in generali), § 12n.
active obligation, obligatio activa, § 12n.
affirmative obligation, obligatio affirmativa, § 19
eternal natural obligation, obligatio naturalis aeterna, § 49
external obligation, obligatio externa, § 112
imperfect natural obligation, obligatio naturalis 
imperfecta, § 98
indispensable natural obligation, obligatio naturalis 
indispensabilis, § 67n.
internal obligation, obligatio interna, § 112
juridical obligation, obligatio iuridica, § 63
moral obligation, obligatio moralis, § 43
natural obligation, obligatio naturalis, § 49
natural and positive juridical obligation, obligatio iuridica 
naturalis et positiva, § 65
necessary natural obligation, obligatio naturalis 
necessaria, § 98, § 100
negative obligation, obligatio negativa, § 19
obligation of conscience, obligatio conscientiae, § 43
obligation in the divine court, obligatio in foro divino, § 112
obligation in the external court, obligatio in foro 
externo, § 122
obligation in the human court, obligatio in foro 
humano, § 112
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obligation in the internal court, obligatio in foro 
interno, § 112
obligation to restore a loss, obligatio ad reparandum 
damnum, § 128
(passive) obligation, obligatio (passiva), § 12
perfect obligation, obligatio perfecta, § 98, § 100
positive moral obligation, obligatio moralis positiva, § 49
satisfy an obligation, obligationi satisfacere, § 25
unchangeable natural obligation, obligatio naturalis 
immutabilis, § 67
universal natural obligation, obligatio naturalis 
universalis, § 67
Obligation in the broad sense, violation of, violatio obligationis 
late, § 34
blameworthy and malicious violation of obligation, 
obligationis violatio culposa et dolosa, § 36
culpable and inculpable violation of obligation, violatio 
obligationis culpabilis et inculpabilis, § 35
excusable and inexcusable violation of obligation, 
obligationis violatio excusabilis et inexcusabilis, § 35
violation of obligation in the strict sense, violatio obligationis 
stricte, § 35
Obligations, conflict of, obligationum collisio, § 25
Obligatory, that which is externally, obligatorium externe, § 115
that which is morally obligatory, obligatorium moraliter, § 46
that which is naturally obligatory, obligatorium 
naturaliter, § 61
that which is obligatory by strict natural law, obligatorium 
iure naturali stricto, § 130
Obstacle, legal, impedimentum legale, § 114
moral obstacle, impedimentum morale, § 45
physical obstacle, impedimentum physicum, § 44
Occasion to act, occasio agendi, § 19
Owed externally (that which is), externally owed action, 
debitum (actio debita) externe, § 115
that which is owed morally, debitum moraliter, § 47
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Own, that which is another’s, alienum, § 119, § 124
not giving the other man his own, suum alteri non 
tribuere, § 120
that which is one’s natural own, suum naturale, § 130
that which is one’s own, suum, § 119, § 124
Owned in the broad sense, that which is, proprium late, § 122
that which is owned in the strict sense, proprium 
stricte, § 125
Perfection of man, moral, perfectio hominis moralis, § 69
Permitted by strict natural law, that which is, permissum iure 
naturali stricto, § 130
that which is permitted externally, permissum externe, § 115
that which is permitted internally, permissum interne, § 115
that which is permitted morally, permissum moraliter, § 46
that which is permitted naturally, permissum naturaliter, § 61
Person, persona, § 6
moral person, persona moralis, § 92
mystical person, persona mystica, § 92
Philosophy, moral, philosophia moralis, § 51
Point, moral, punctum morale, § 57
Possibility, legal, possibilitas legalis, § 114
moral possibility, possibilitas moralis, § 44
Possible, that which is legally, possibile legaliter, § 114
possibile moraliter, that which is morally possible, § 44
Power, that which is in one’s, potestate in alicuius positum, § 8
Prescribed by strict natural law, that which is, praeceptum iure 
naturali stricto, § 130
that which is prescribed externally, praeceptum externe, § 115
that which is prescribed internally, praeceptum interne, § 115
that which is prescribed morally, praeceptum moraliter, § 46
Principle of existence of natural law in the broad sense, 
principium fiendi iuris naturalis late dicti, § 58
complex principle of knowledge of natural law in the broad 
sense, principium cognoscendi iuris naturalis late dicti 
complexum, § 58
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complex principle of knowledge of obligation in general, 
principium cognoscendi complexum obligationis in 
genere, § 23
incomplex principle of knowledge of natural law in the broad 
sense, principium cognoscendi iuris naturalis late dicti 
incomplexum, § 59
principle of existence of obligation in general, principium 
fiendi obligationis in genere, § 23
Privilege of necessity, favor necessitatis, § 145
Prohibited naturally, that which is, prohibitum naturaliter, § 61
Promulgation of a law, promulgatio legis, § 66
Proprietorship in the broad sense, proprietas late, § 122
proprietorship in the strict sense, proprietas stricte, § 125
Prosperity of man, prosperitas hominis, § 24
Publication of a law, publicatio legis, § 66
Punishment, poena, § 2
natural punishment, poena naturalis, § 65
positive punishment, poena positiva, § 65
punishment in the juridical sense, poena iuridice talis, § 63
Punishments, divine, poenae divinae, § 68
divine punishments natural and arbitrary, poenae divinae 
eaeque naturales et arbitrariae, § 68
Reason in the sense of a faculty of the soul, ratio qua facultas 
animae, § 4
Reputation, existimatio, § 72
good and bad reputation, existimatio bona et mala, § 72
Respectability, honestas, § 72
Respectable, that which is, honestum, § 72
Restoration of loss, reparatio damni, § 128
Restriction, tacit, restrictio tacita, § 57
Revelation in general, revelatio in genere, § 64n.
special revelation, revelatio specialis, § 64n.
Reward in the broad sense, meritum late, § 27
reward in the strict sense, meritum stricte, § 27
Right of another, ius (subiective) alienum, § 120
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disturb another’s right, ius alterius turbare, § 120
external right, ius externum, § 114
grant another’s proper right, ius suum alteri tribuere, § 120
one’s (proper/own) right, ius suum, § 119, § 124
internal right, ius internum, § 114
moral right, ius morale, § 44
natural and positive right, ius subiective idque naturale et 
positivum, § 65
natural right in the broad sense, ius naturale late dictum, § 87
natural right of security, ius naturale securitatis, § 134
natural right taken in the strict sense or strict natural right, 
ius naturale stricte dictum seu strictum, § 100, § 108
natural right to avert danger, ius naturale ad periculum 
propulsandum, § 134
natural right to defend oneself and that which is one’s own, 
ius naturale sese suumque defendendi, § 133
natural right to resist one who tries to wrong us, ius naturale 
resistendi laedere conanti, § 133
own (proper) right in the broad sense, ius proprium 
late, § 122
own (proper) right in the strict sense, ius proprium 
stricte, § 125
perfect right, ius perfectum, § 100
purely facultative right, ius merae facultatis, § 115
remove another’s proper right, ius suum alteri auferre, § 120
right in the sense of moral ability, ius subiective pro facultate 
morali sumtum, § 44
right in the sense of a person’s ability, ius subiective pro 
facultate personae, § 114
right in the sense of physical ability, ius subiective pro 
facultate physica, § 63
Rightful action (externally), actio iusta (externe), § 116
that which is externally rightful, iustum externe tale, § 116
Security, securitas, § 134
Shamefulness, turpitudo, § 72
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Sin, peccatum, § 47
natural sin, peccatum naturale, § 61
Sociality, socialitas, § 83
Societies, domestic, societates domesticae, § 95
Society, societas, § 82
composite society, societas composita, § 94
simple society, societas simplex, § 94
society’s welfare, salus societatis, § 85
universal society in the broad sense, societas universalis 
late, § 82
universal society in the strict sense, societas universalis 
stricte, § 83
Soul’s control of the body, human, animae humanae regimen in 
corpus, § 9n.**
human soul, faculties of, see faculty
human soul’s overlordship over itself, animae humanae 
imperium in se ipsam, § 9n.**
Spirit, spiritus, § 6
Spontaneity, spontaneitas, § 6
State of man, extraordinary, status hominis 
extraordinarius, § 143
extrasocial state, status extrasocialis, § 91
irregular state, status irregularis, § 141
natural state, status naturalis, § 91
ordinary state, status ordinarius, § 143
regular state, status regularis, § 143
social state, status socialis, § 91
Stimulus, stimulus, § 11
Superior, superior, § 63
Theology, moral positive, theologia positiva moralis, § 51
Threatens a wrong, one who, laesionem intentans, § 134
Transgression of a law and obligation, anomia, transgressio 
legis et obligationis, violatio legis et obligationis, § 34
culpable transgression, transgressio culpabilis, § 35
blameworthy transgression, transgressio culposa, § 36
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malicious transgression, transgressio dolosa, § 36
excusable transgression, transgressio excusabilis, § 35
inculpable transgression, transgressio inculpabilis, 
transgressio inculpata, § 35
inexcusable transgression, transgressio inexcusabilis, § 35
transgression in the broad sense, transgressio late, § 34
transgression in the strict sense, transgressio stricte, § 35
Unchangeability of natural obligation, immutabilitas 
obligationis naturalis, § 67
Unhappiness of man, infelicitas hominis, § 24
internal and external unhappiness, infelicitas interna et 
externa, § 24
Universal law (in the broad sense) of nations, ius universale late 
dictum gentium, § 97
universal household law in the broad sense, ius universale 
oeconomicum late dictum, § 95
universal law (in the broad sense) of domestic societies, ius 
universale late dictum societatum domesticarum, § 95
universal law of particular societies, ius universale 
societatum particularium, § 91
universal social law in the broad sense, ius sociale universale 
late dictum, § 91
Universality of natural obligation, universalitas obligationis 
naturalis, § 67
Unjust man, an externally, iniustus externe talis, § 116
Unwillingness, noluntas, § 4
Use, uti, § 119
use of one’s right, usus iuris sui, § 119
use one’s right, uti iure suo, § 89, § 119
Useful, that which is, utile, § 85
Usefulness, utilitas, § 85 
Vice, vitium, § 47
Violence in the broad sense, violentia late, § 135
violence in the strict sense, violentia stricte, § 98
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Virtue (moral), virtus (moralis), § 47
natural virtue, virtus naturalis, § 61
Will, voluntas, § 4
Wrong, laesio, § 118
blameworthy wrong, laesio culposa, § 118
culpable wrong, laesio culpabilis, § 118
imminent wrong, laesio imminens, § 133
inculpable wrong, laesio inculpabilis, § 118
malicious wrong, laesio dolosa, § 118
natural wrong, laesio naturalis, § 130
wrong of commission, laesio commissiva, § 118
wrong of omission, laesio omissiva, § 118
Wrongful action, (externally), actio iniusta (externe), § 116
wrongful by strict natural law, that which is, iniustum iure 

























This is the first English translation of the Prolegomena iuris 
 naturalis by Gottfried Achenwall (1719–1772). In this book, 
Achenwall presents the philosophical foundation for his com-
prehensive  theory of natural law. The book is of interest not 
only because it provides the basis for a careful, systematic, and 
well-respected eighteenth-century theory of natural law in the 
Leibniz-Wolffian tradition, but also because it sheds important 
light on the work of Immanuel Kant. Achenwall’s work influ-
enced Kant’s legal and political philosophy as well as his ethics, 
and it is indispensable for understanding Kant’s Feyerabend 
Lectures on Natural Law and his Metaphysics of Morals. The 
present volume complements the translation of Achenwall’s 
handbook, Natural Law.
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